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Unconscionable Contracts: A Comparative
Study of the Approaches in England,
France, Germany, and the United
States
A.H. ANGELO* AND E.P. ELLINGER**
I. FREEDOM OF CONTRACT AND UNCONSCIONABILITY OF TERMS
The doctrine of sanctity of contracts is entrenched in both the
Anglo-American and western European legal systems. The phrase
"freedom of contract" originated in the late eighteenth and the early
nineteenth centuries,' and was based on the natural law principle that
it is "natural" for parties to perform their bargains or pacts. 2 During
that period, the doctrine was incorporated into the Prussian Code of
1794 and into the French Civil Code promulgated in 1804. Other
continental codifications later adopted this doctrine. During this
same period, English law embraced the doctrine as a manifestation of
freedom of trade.3 In all probability, the widespread acceptance of
"freedom of contract" resulted from the influence of the laissez faire
spirit, championed by the rising and eventually triumphant middle
class of Europe.4 This influence explains why the doctrine continues
to be known by a phrase that utilizes the word "freedom."
At present, "freedom of contract" means that the parties to a
transaction are free, or "entitled," to agree on, or "to choose," any
lawful terms. Accordingly, the courts generally will not interfere with
a bargain, and will not reshape its terms. Therefore, a person who
* Professor and Dean of Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington. B.A., Vic-
toria University of Wellington, 1964; LL.B., Victoria University of Wellington, 1964; LL.M.,
Victoria University of Wellington, 1965; Dip Droit Compare, Strasbourg, 1967.
** Professor of Law, National University of Singapore. M. Jur., Jerusalem, 1959; D.
Phil., Oxon, 1964. Portions of this Article were published in A.H. Angelo & E.P. Ellinger,
Unconscionable Contracts-A Comparative Study, 4 OTAGO L. REV. 300 (1979).
1. For emphasis on "freedom," see in particular JEAN DOMAT, TRAITE DES Loix ch.
IV: II; JEAN-ETIENNE-MARIE PORTALIS, DiscouRS PRELIMINAIRE Fenet II, at 463.
2. See 2 HuGo GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACiS LIBRI TRis, reprinted in THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 391-408 (James Brown Scott ed. & Francis W. Kelsey
trans., 1964).
3. P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 3 (3d ed. 1981).
4. WOLFGANG G. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (1972).
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enters into a contract voluntarily is bound by it even if he subse-
quently finds the contract unacceptable and has valid commercial,
though not legal, grounds for seeking to avoid it. As a result, the
current emphasis is on the word "contract," rather than the "free-
dom" aspect of the doctrine.
In contrast, the primary emphasis of the doctrine in its early
stages of development was not on the "contract" aspect. Paragraph I
3.1 of the Prussian Code, which exemplifies the importance of free-
dom, reads: "Undertakings can give rise to [enforceable] rights only
insofar as these undertakings are freely given."' 5 This provision at-
tempts to ensure that contracts and other dealings will not bind a
person who had not freely consented to the terms. Articles 1108
through 1112 of the French Civil Code6 and articles 116 and 145 of
the German Civil Code7 also emphasize the importance of "freedom
of will." As such, the doctrine of freedom of contract aims to ensure
freedom of action rather than to consecrate bargains. For a society
divided into superior and inferior classes, the doctrine represented a
step in the direction of liberalism.
This background explains the tendency of the codes, and likewise
the common law, to recognize the absence of "free will" as a defense
to actions brought in contract. Examples of this type of defense in-
clude duress, undue influence, deceit, and mistake. The codes and the
Anglo-American case law of the early nineteenth century reflected the
lack of need for additional safeguards. During that period, standard
form contracts, which conferred excessive rights on one party while
depriving the other of any effective remedy, were not a serious
problem.
It is ironic that during the last decades of the nineteenth century
and into the twentieth century, the concept of "freedom of contract,"
which originally was used to invalidate contracts made without the
parties' freely given consent, became the very tool used to establish
the sanctity of standard form contracts. Numerous cases have held
5. Author's translation; see also para. I 4.4 concerning a declaration of intention. The
notion of free will is echoed in para. I 5.1 concerning contracts. See Dr. Hans Hattenhauer,
Introduction to ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FOR DIE PREUSSISCHEN STAATEN 31 (Alfred
Metzner Verlag ed., 1970).
6. CODE CIVIL [C. Civ.] arts. 1108-1112 (Fr.), translated in THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE,
As AMENDED TO JULY 1, 1976 (John H. Crabb trans., 1977).
7. BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] arts. 116, 145 (F.R.G.), translated in THE




that a person who was foolish enough to enter into an oppressive stan-
dard form contract without reading it could not expect a reprieve
from the courts.8 Of course, judges have commented on the fact that
many contracts of this type were not meant to be read and, least of all,
to be understood. 9 Nevertheless, it consistently has been held that a
party's inability to understand the terms of the "freely made" con-
tract did not negate the party's consent to its terms.
The use of standard form contracts burgeoned in the late nine-
teenth century, and they have gained popularity ever since. At pres-
ent, standard form contracts are predominant in most areas of trade
and commerce. This is due to the increasing number of situations in
which the parties to a contract do not have equal bargaining power.
Undoubtedly, certain types of contracts, such as lending and tenancy
agreements, have always contained some element of inequality. But,
generally speaking, a lawyer in the eighteenth or first half of the nine-
teenth century had good reason to regard a contract as a bargain be-
tween parties having comparable capacities to safeguard their
respective rights. In a period in which small traders and artisans
competed for customers, the law of supply and demand precluded the
introduction of standard form contracts with one-sided terms.
The emergence of large monopolistic companies, such as the
early railways, completely changed the balance of power in negotia-
tions. These companies had the power to offer their services on
whatever terms they pleased.10 Any equality of bargaining power be-
tween such giants and the average citizen was, and has remained, ilu-
sory. The rise of multinational corporations and their subsidiaries in
the mid-twentieth century has only aggravated the situation. Typi-
cally, even state-controlled bodies, such as state-owned railways, use
standard form contracts that give them a decisive advantage. "
It would be unreasonable to suggest that the use of standard
form contracts is, in itself, objectionable or unconscionable. A large
industrial entity has a genuine interest in defining its liability to cus-
tomers and in standardizing the terms on which it supplies goods or
8. See, e.g., L'Estrange v. F. Graucob Ltd., [1934] 2 K.B. 394 (Eng.); Galbraith v.
Mitchenall Estates Ltd., [1965] 2 Q.B. 473, 479 (1964) (Eng.); S. Austl. Rys. Comm'r v. Egan,
47 A.L.J.R. 140 (1973) (Austl.).
9. See McCutcheon v. David MacBrayne Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 125, 133 (Eng. H.L.)
(appeal taken from Scot.) (Devlin, L.J.).
10. Note the ticket cases such as Parker v. S.E. Ry. Co., [1877] 2 C.P.D. 416 (Eng.).
11. See, e.g., Egan, 47 A.L.J.R. at 140 (standard form contracts used by such a body
described as oppressive).
1992]
Loy. LA. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
furnishes services. While parties may negotiate some specific terms,
such as the price or the date of payment, the standard form usually
governs the general terms and conditions related to the supply of
goods or to the furnishing of services. Other sectors of the commer-
cial world, such as lending institutions, carriers, and insurers, use the
standard form in a similar manner.
Although standard form contracts are not objectionable in the
abstract, they do tend to be one-sided documents. Indeed, some con-
tracts of this type release the suppliers from any liability for the qual-
ity of the goods or give them discretion to exercise extremely far
reaching powers should the other party default or delay performance.
The contract may so decisively favor the stronger party that it be-
comes oppressive. The exact nature of the oppressive or unfair ele-
ment may vary greatly. An excessive interest rate, a contractual
penalty, an onerous provision pertaining to the repossession of goods
supplied under a hire purchase agreement, and a particularly wide
exemption clause are all examples of oppressive elements of a con-
tract. The common factor found in all these examples is the "uncon-
scionability" of the bargain.
When analyzing these types of contracts and the problems cre-
ated by them, it is important to distinguish between two methods or
strategies the stronger party will employ in an effort to safeguard its
position or to enable it to reap the maximum profit. The first strategy
incorporates clauses that confer on the stronger party specific rights
or protections. An exemption clause that absolves the stronger party
from any liability for default in the performance of the contract and a
provision for an excessive interest rate or penalties for arrears in pay-
ment are typical examples of this strategy. The second strategy re-
lates not so much to the actual terms of the contract but, rather, to
the manner in which the stronger party exercises its rights under a
clause that may be unobjectionable in itself. For example, a hire
purchase agreement might contain a clause that entitles a finance
company to seize the goods and to demand payment of the total out-
standing balance of the debt if the hirer defaults in the payment of an
installment. If the hirer becomes insolvent, this clause may assist the
company to gain priority over the hirer's general creditors. The
clause in this case serves a legitimate objective. This contrasts with a
situation where the company exercises its rights under this clause
against a solvent hirer with a good financial record, simply because
there is a short delay in the payment of a single installment. Under
458 [Vol. 14:455
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these circumstances, it is unjust and commercially unreasonable for
the company to use the clause. This is particularly true if the com-
pany intends to reinstate the contract after extracting a penalty or
"bonus" from the hirer, rather than retain and resell the goods.' 2
Although the indignation provoked by this type of case ought to
be directed at the company's behavior rather than at the clause itself,
in the majority of cases, the stronger party's objectionable conduct
and the clause used to justify it are inseparable. Thus, in the last illus-
tration, a more narrowly phrased clause would prevent the company
from making its unreasonable demand. At the same time, the inclu-
sion of a clause with such a general scope of application is more prac-
tical because it is virtually impossible to foresee every situation for
which such a clause may be required.
This Article emphasizes the distinction between unconscionable
contract clauses and the harsh and unfair exercise of contractual
rights. Part II of the Article will show that both common law and
civil law countries have developed specific doctrines to provide suita-
ble remedies in both cases. Although the courts developed some of
these doctrines from general contract law principles, the legislatures
conducted the bulk of the assault on the citadel of the sanctity of
contract. The object of this Article is to compare the approaches to
unconscionability in two representative common law systems, Eng-
land and the United States, and in two civil law jurisdictions, France
and Germany. In doing so, this Article shows that, although uncon-
scionability originated from the freedom of contract doctrine, a source
common to the four systems, there are marked differences in the de-
vices that each of these countries use to combat abuses. Two systems
have developed some general doctrines as a basis for granting relief,
while the two remaining ones have used a piecemeal approach.
II. COMPARING THE SYSTEMS
A. Scope of Discussion
The comparative study conducted in this part of the Article con-
centrates on the development of unconscionability concepts in the
common and civil law systems. It does not discuss defenses of a gen-
12. Legislation governs repossessions in most western European countries. In the United
Kingdom, sections 90 through 93 of the Consumer Credit Act of 1974 is the current law
governing this area. See Consumer Credit Act, 1974, §§ 90-93, reprinted in 11 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES (4th ed. 1991 reissue) [hereinafter Consumer Credit
Act].
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eral nature, such as duress, undue influence, and mistake, which are
distinguishable from unconscionability both conceptually and practi-
cally. Conceptually, these defenses seek to protect a non-consenting
party to a contract. Unconscionability rules, on the other hand, apply
when a party willingly, though foolishly, accepts a bargain that in-
cludes oppressive terms, or where the stronger party exercises its
rights under the contract in a manner that is harsh or unfair. The
practical distinction relates to the remedy. Where duress, undue in-
fluence, or mistake are established, the contract is usually voided or
set aside. A monetary remedy granted to either party would, there-
fore, be in tort or restitution. A contract tainted with unconscionabil-
ity, however, need not be treated as void or set aside: Once relief is
granted against the oppressive term or against the objectionable exer-
cise of powers by the stronger party, the contract may be left intact or
be made enforceable subject to variation. This Article will discuss
this characteristic of unconscionability, which manifests itself in the
common law systems of England and the United States and the civil
law systems of France and Germany.
B. Unconscionability in Select Areas of English Law
In England, the sanctity of contract constituted a well-estab-
lished common law principle by the seventeenth century. Equity,
however, intervened in limited situations to grant relief from harsh
and unconscionable bargains. These cases are discussed in detail in a
study that correlates the assault on harsh and unconscionable con-
tracts with the development of certain contract law principles, such as
the setting aside of penalty clauses and the entrenchment of the equity
of redemption.' 3 The most interesting instance is with respect to the
development of unconscionability rules bargains extracted from ex-
pectant heirs.
The origin of the rule that equity will grant relief against harsh
and unconscionable bargains extracted from expectant heirs and re-
maindermen can be traced back to Lord Chancellors Ellesmere, Ba-
con, and Coventry.14 By the end of the seventeenth century, courts
were using the rule as the basis for reopening bargains in which young
noblemen had sold their expectancies or granted rent-charges against
them for inadequate consideration. In the leading case of Earl of
13. S.M. Waddarns, Unconscionability in Contracts, 39 MOD. L. REV. 369 (1976).
14. See Batty v. Lloyd, 23 Eng. Rep. 375 (1682); see also Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen,
28 Eng. Rep. 82, 86 (1750).
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Ardglasse v. Muschamp,15 Lord Chancellors Keeper, North, and Jef-
freys observed that equity would not intervene to set aside or to reo-
pen a bargain into which the parties had entered voluntarily. 16 Relief
would be granted only if the transaction involved some trading on a
weakness of the expectant heir. In Earl of Ardglasse, the transaction
was reopened because the young Earl had engaged in wild and riotous
living and had signed the agreement while incapable of compre-
hending the nature of the bargain. 17 A few years later, in Wiseman v.
Beake,18 the court granted relief to a remainderman who was a Proc-
tor at Doctors Commons because the consideration was so inadequate
that it indicated clear fraud, 19 and one party had taken advantage of
the remainderman's dire need of money in order to extract the harsh-
est terms possible. 20
These cases involved more than the granting of a remedy against
an oppressive bargain; they involved an attempt to protect the estates
of the landed classes. The decision of Lord Chancellor Thurlow in
Gwyne v. Heaton21 echoes this element of special protection:
The heir of a family dealing for an expectancy in that family shall
be distinguished from ordinary cases, and a bargain made with him
shall not only be looked upon as oppressive in the particular in-
stance, and therefore avoided, but as pernicious in principle, and
therefore repressed.
22
This indeed may have been one of the factors that in due course led to
a slanting of the doctrine in favor of the expectant heir.23 By the mid-
dle of the nineteenth century, mere inadequacy of consideration had
become a sufficient reason for reopening the bargain. 24
This modification of the underlying principle created two unde-
sirable consequences. First, courts too easily set aside or modified
bargains with expectant heirs, a development that induced Lord
15. 23 Eng. Rep. 438 (1684).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 23 Eng. Rep. 688 (1690).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 122.
21. 28 Eng. Rep. 949 (Ch. 1778).
22. Id. at 953.
23. See, e.g., Osmond v. Fitzroy, 24 Eng. Rep. 997 (1731); Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. at 82.
24. See Fry v. Lane, 40 Ch. D. 312, 323 (1888) (Eng.) (Kay, J.); Earl of Aylesford v.
Morris, [1861-78] All E.R. 300, 302 (Eng. C.A. 1873) (Selborne, L.J.); see also LIONEL A.
SHERIDAN, FRAUD IN EQUITY: A STUDY IN ENGLISH AND IRISH LAW 73-86 (1957); Wad-
dams, supra note 13, at 386.
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Selborne to observe that at some point the rule had become arbi-
trary. 25 In an effort to clarify the rule, the legislature re-established in
1868 that a sale of an expectancy or a reversion could be reopened
only where the bargain was unconscionable. 26 The second conse-
quence, which resulted directly from the ease with which courts inter-
vened in bargains with expectant heirs, was a growing reluctance to
extend the application of the rule. This, in turn, became an impedi-
ment to the development of a general doctrine that could have ena-
bled the courts to grant relief against any bargain tainted with
unconscionability. 27 Even in cases involving usurious bargains, which
became free from legislative controls in 1854,2s the courts were slow
to intervene. Two cases that held that courts could reopen a harsh
and unconscionable lending transaction even where the borrower was
not an expectant heir were Barrett v. Hartley29 and Nevill v. Snell-
ing.30 However, these cases were anomalies and did not lead to the
establishment of a general rule. Ultimately, the legislature established
the general rule with respect to loans by passing the Money-Lenders
Act of 1900.31
A similar pattern also emerged in other areas of contract law.
Waddams' study32 demonstrates that the assault on forfeiture and
penalty clauses, which aimed at combating their harshness, resulted in
the development of doctrines that defined certain clauses that could
be set aside. These same doctrines, however, obliterated the underly-
ing question of unconscionability. Exemption clauses serve as a typi-
cal example. 33 Although the attack on exemption clauses was
motivated by their potential for unconscionable effect, instead of cre-
ating criteria based on the unconscionability of disputed clauses, the
courts developed specific doctrines, including rules of construction
and the controversial doctrine of fundamental breach.
The harsh enforcement of contractual rights also resisted direct
use of an unconscionability concept. The rule of de minimis non curat
25. See Morris, [1861-78] All E.R. at 302 (Selborne, L.J.).
26. Sale of Reversions Act, 1868 (Eng.), reprinted in 16 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENG-
LAND para. 1233 (4th ed. 1976).
27. As to an extension of the doctrine in Canada, see Waddams, supra note 13, at 386.
28. See Usury Laws Repeal Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 90 (U.K.).
29. 2 L.R.-Eq. 789, 795 (1886) (Eng.).
30. 15 Ch. D. 679, 696-97 (1880) (Eng.).
31. An Act to Amend the Law with Respect to Persons Carrying on Business as Money-
Lenders, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict. 155, ch. 51 (Eng.) [hereinafter Money-Lenders Act].
32. See Waddams, supra note 13.
33. Id. at 378.
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lex 34 and the construction of clauses making the purchase of land
"subject to finance" illustrate this point.
The rule of de minimis non curat lex developed from cases in
which a buyer attempted to reject goods due to a minute departure
from the prescribed weight or contractual description. The leading
case of Shipton, Anderson & Co. v. Weil Bro& & Co.35 held that the
buyer could not reject the goods because they exceeded the stipulated
maximum of 4950 tons by a mere 55 pounds. In contrast, the decision
in Arcos, Ltd. v. E.A. Ronaasen & Son 36 entitled the buyer to reject
staves of wood that were nine-sixteenths of an inch thick instead of
half an inch thick, as prescribed in the contract of sale. The two cases
are, of course, easily distinguishable on their facts. The excess of fifty-
five pounds in the first case did not burden the buyer; the one-six-
teenth inch difference in thickness in the second case could have af-
fected the buyer's intended use for the half-inch staves. Presumably,
if the staves were to be ten inches thick and they deviated by one-
sixteenth of an inch, the court would have found the discrepancy in-
significant and thus applied the de minimis rule.
Interestingly, the application of an unconscionability concept
would have led to identical results. An insignificant difference in
weight, which was meaningless from the buyer's perspective, would
not entitle the buyer to reject an otherwise conforming shipment of
goods. The buyer's attempt to reject the goods on such a trifling
ground would constitute an unjustifiable exercise of contractual
rights. The buyer could, on the other hand, plead a minute deviation
if it rendered the goods unsuitable for the object for which they were
ordered.
The second example, that of contracts for the purchase of land
that are subject to the buyer's securing financing, is of more recent
origin. Clearly, a financing stipulation is justifiable in countries where
mortgage money is scarce. It enables a buyer who is unable to obtain
the required loan to withdraw from the contract of sale without incur-
ring a loss. However, some purchasers invoke this type of clause
solely because they change their mind about the sale, and never at-
tempt to raise the required financing. The courts have consistently
precluded purchasers who are guilty of such conduct from using this
34. "De minimis non curat lex" means that the law does not concern itself with trifling or
small matters. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 431 (6th ed. 1990).
35. (1912] 1 K.B. 574 (Eng.).
36. 1933 App. Cas. 470 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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clause as an escape route. In some cases, courts have held that the
contract included an implied term imposing a duty on the purchaser
tQ take reasonable steps to arrange financing.3 7 In Barber v. Crick-
ett,38 however, the court held that "where a contract is conditional on
a purchaser raising a mortgage, the purchaser can assert the non-ful-
fillment of the condition only where it occurs without default on his
part."' 39 Clearly, in Barber, the purchaser's questionable conduct
served as the basis of the decision. The same factor would have
guided a court applying an unconscionability concept. Nevertheless,
courts in other cases typically have sidestepped the issue, achieving
the same result by invoking an implied term.
The illustrations discussed thus far reveal the courts' resistance
to the development of generally applicable unconscionability rules. If
this attitude persists, it will defeat unconscionability rules even where
introduced by statute. However, concepts akin to unconscionability
have been employed successfully in some areas of contract law, such
as restraint of trade and estoppel. The use of a statutory unconsciona-
bility concept is illustrated by the Money-Lenders Act of 1900,"4
which was superseded by sections 137 through 140 of the Consumer
Credit Act of 1974.41
Courts have intervened in restraint of trade contracts for two ba-
sic reasons: (1) the public interest in maintaining free competition;
and (2) the danger of traders and employees restricting their right to
freedom of action. However, these concerns must be balanced against
other legitimate interests, such as the interest of a purchaser of a busi-
ness in precluding the seller from establishing a competing enterprise
in the same locality, or, similarly, the interest of a tradesman or pro-
fessional who trains an apprentice in a highly skilled trade. In deter-
mining the validity of specific clauses, courts have applied two tests:
(1) whether the restrictive covenant was compatible with the public
interest; and (2) whether it was reasonable as between the parties.42
From a practical standpoint, the second test derives from a basic un-
conscionability concept: whether a specific covenant is reasonable as
37. See, e.g., Scott v. Rania, 1966 N.Z.L.R. 527, 534; Mulvena v. Kelman, 1965 N.Z.L.R.
656, 657.
38. 1958 N.Z.L.R. 1057.
39. Id. at 1060 (Cleary, J.); cf Gardner v. Gould, 1972 N.Z.L.R. 943, 947.
40. Money-Lenders Act, supra note 31.
41. Consumer Credit Act, supra note 12, §§ 137-140.
42. The leading nineteenth century case elucidating these tests was Nordenfelt v. Maxim
Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., 1894 App. Cas. 535 (appeal taken from Eng.).
[Vol. 14:455
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between the parties depends on whether it involves a restriction that is
no broader than necessary for the covenantee's protection. 43 The sim-
ilarity between this test and the unconscionability concept was recog-
nized by the House of Lords in A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v.
Macaulay.44
Similar references to either fairness or equitability appear in nu-
merous cases concerning estoppel and waiver. These cases typically
involve a situation where one party's conduct has led the other party
to believe that he need not perform a contractual duty on time or in
the manner agreed, and the first party then changes his mind and
insists on performance of that duty. Of course, it would be a mistake
to overlook the specific rules developed in this technical area of law.
But it is noteworthy that in one of the older leading cases on point,
Lord Cairns observed that a person would not be permitted to enforce
his rights "where [doing so] would be inequitable having regard to the
dealings [that] have.., taken place between the parties. 45 This early
reference to an equitable remedy's focus on the specific facts in each
particular case parallels the modern concept of unconscionability.
The last two illustrations suggest that the doctrine of unconscio-
nability need not be used in stealth. Where courts use it openly, un-
conscionability can be just as effective as the devices used to attain the
same object indirectly. Perhaps the best illustrations of the effective
use of the doctrine of unconscionability are the cases decided under
section 1 of the Money-Lenders Act of 190046 and its counterparts in
other acts within the British commonwealth. The Money-Lenders
Act enabled courts to reopen usurious bargains, and to determine in
each case a proper rate of interest with regard to the security fur-
nished, the risk, the period of the loan, and the amount advanced.
47
Indeed, the usefulness of this provision of the Money-Lenders Act
was recognized by the drafters of the Consumer Credit Act of 197448
when they adopted the earlier Money-Lenders Act into sections 137
43. Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, [1916] 1 App. Cas. 688, 707 (appeal taken from
Scot.).
44. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308, 1315 (Eng. H.L.).
45. Hughes v. Directors of the Metro. Ry. Co., [1877] 2 App. Cas. 439, 448 (appeal taken
from Eng.). These words are echoed in D. & C. Builders Ltd. v. Rees, [1966] 2 Q.B. 617 (Eng.
C.A. 1965).
46. Money-Lenders Act, supra note 31.
47. CLIFFORD L. PANNAM, LAW OF MONEYLENDERS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEA-
LAND (1965). But see A. Kelly, Ltd. v. Scott, 1981 I.C.R. 281 (Eng.) (upholding a rate of
48% per annum in a loan secured over land).
48. Consumer Credit Act, supra note 12.
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through 140 of the Consumer Credit Act.49 Under section 137 of the
Consumer Credit Act, the courts have the power to reexamine any
credit transactions that they consider extortionate.50
In view of the courts' effective applications of the unconscionabil-
ity concept in limited areas of contract law, there is some question as
to why it is not applied in an equally open manner in other types of
cases. The answer, presumably, can be found in the reluctance of the
courts and the legislature to depart in an open manner from the lais-
sez faire concept of contracts.
This "hands-off" approach was understandable in the nineteenth
century and in the first decades of the twentieth century, when laissez
faire was at its zenith. However, the position has changed during the
twentieth century. The laissez faire spirit, and with it the freedom of
contract doctrine, has eroded in substantial branches of contract law,
such as hire-purchase, carriage of goods, restrictive trade practices,
and, most recently, in the field of consumer credit. This gradual abro-
gation of freedom of contract in specific fields has impacted the atti-
tude of the courts. Thus, an early decision 5' that set aside a bargain
because one party's poverty and ignorance led him to accept a com-
pletely inadequate price for a share in an estate was applied in a mod-
em case that voided a wife's agreement to transfer, without
consideration, the matrimonial home into her husband's name in the
course of divorce proceedings. 52 Indeed, a number of modem cases
suggest that the English courts were favorably inclined to the notion
of developing a general doctrine of setting aside unconscionable
bargains.
In the first of these cases, Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy,53 a guaran-
tee was set aside because the beneficiary, Lloyds Bank, had failed to
comply with a fiduciary duty that it owed to the guarantor, who was
one of its clients. However, Lord Denning appeared prepared to base
his judgment on an additional ground, which he explained as follows:
Gathering all together, I would suggest that through all these in-
49. Id. §§ 137-140; see also Hire-Purchase Act, 1960, No. 33, § 32 (N.S.W.); Hire-
Purchase Act, 1971, No. 147, § 37 (N.Z.).
50. Consumer Credit Act, supra note 12, § 137. But some cases suggest a court ought to
intervene only if the lender "took advantage" of the borrower. See Wills v. Wood, 128 Sol. J.
222 (1984) (Eng. C.A.); see also Davies v. Direct Loans Ltd., [1986] 1 W.L.R. 823 (Eng. Ch.).
51. Evans v. Llewellin, 29 Eng. Rep. 1191 (Ch. 1787), followed in Fry v. Lane, 40 Ch. D.
312 (1888) (Eng.).
52. See Cresswell v. Potter, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 255 (1968) (Eng. Ch.); see also Backhouse v.
Backhouse, [1978] 1 W.L.R. 243 (Eng. Faro.).
53. [1975] 1 Q.B. 326 (Eng. C.A.).
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stances there runs a single thread. They rest on "inequality of bar-
gaining power." By virtue of it, the English law gives relief to one
who, without independent advice, enters into a contract upon
terms which are very unfair or transfers property for a considera-
tion which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining power is
grievously impaired by reason of his own needs or desires, or by his
own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue influences or pres-
sures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit of the other.
When I use the word "undue" I do not mean to suggest that the
principle depends on proof of any wrongdoing. The one who stipu-
lates for an unfair advantage may be moved solely by his own self-
interest, unconscious of the distress he is bringing to the other. I
have also avoided any reference to the will of the one being "domi-
nated" or "overcome" by the other. One who is in extreme need
may knowingly consent to a most improvident bargain, solely to
relieve the straits in which he finds himself.
54
In a second case, A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v. Macau-
lay,55 a publisher engaged the services of a composer for five years and
acquired the exclusive right of publishing all works composed by him
during that period. However, the contract, which was in a standard
form used by the publisher, did not impose on him a duty to publish
the composer's works. The House of Lords set aside the contract,
with Lord Diplock observing:
[W]hat your Lordships have in fact been doing has been to assess
the relative bargaining power of the publisher and the song writer
at the time the contract was made and to decide whether the pub-
lisher had used his superior bargaining power to extract from the
song writer promises that were unfairly onerous to him.
56
His Lordship observed that in the nineteenth century the laissezfaire
doctrine induced the courts to discontinue the granting of remedies
based on "public policy" considerations as a general relief against un-
conscionable contracts.57 Public policy as a concern remained appli-
cable only in specific fields. In the case of contracts in restraint of
trade, Lord Diplock believed that, although the reasoning of nine-
teenth century judges appeared to abide by contemporary economic
doctrines, the courts did strike down bargains if they considered them
54. Id. at 339 (Lord Denning, M.R.).
55. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308 (Eng. H.L.).
56. Id. at 1315 (Diplock, L.J.).
57. Id.
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to be unconscionable. 58 The real test employed appeared to be
whether the bargain was fair. His Lordship emphasized the difference
between freely negotiated contracts and standard form contracts of-
fered on a "take it or leave it" basis, and suggested that in the latter
there was greater need for vigilance on the part of the courts to see
that these forms were not used to facilitate unconscionable bargains.
59
The A Schroeder Music Publishing Co. decision was followed by a
third case, Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. WE.A. Records Ltd. ,60
which concerned another publishing agreement involving an element
of restraint of trade executed on a standard form proffered by the
entrepreneurs.
61
Read on their own, these decisions can be considered to have laid
the foundation for a general doctrine combatting unfair bargains on
the ground of their unconscionability. Later decisions, however,
show that the movement lost its momentum. The case of Alec Lobb
(Garages) Ltd. v. Total Oil (Great Britain) Ltd. 62 concerned a gas sta-
tion lease that required the lessee to purchase his supplies solely from
the lessors for a considerable period of time. The court of appeal re-
fused to regard the inequality of the parties' bargaining powers as a
ground for setting aside the transaction. The court's decision was
partially influenced by the fact that the lessee had obtained independ-
ent legal advice. The court did, however, discredit the doctrine pro-
posed by Lord Denning in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy.63 In the words
of Lord Justice Dillon:
Inequality of bargaining power must anyhow be a relative concept.
It is seldom in any negotiation that the bargaining powers of the
parties are absolutely equal. Any individual wanting to borrow
money from a bank, building society or other financial institution
in order to pay his liabilities or buy some property he urgently
wants to acquire will have virtually no bargaining power; he will
have to take or leave the terms offered to him. So, with house
property in a seller's market, the purchaser will not have equal bar-
gaining power with the vendor. But Lord Denning M.R. did not
58. Id.
59. See id. at 1316 (Diplock, L.J.); see also id. at 1314-15 (Reid, L.J.).
60. [1975] 1 W.L.R. 61 (Eng. C.A.); see also Shell U.K. Ltd. v. Lostock Garages Ltd.,
[1976] 1 W.L.R. 1187 (Eng. C.A.). For a different approach, see Jacobs v. Bills, 1967
N.Z.L.R. 249, 252-53; Peeters v. Schimanski, [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 328, 335; see also P.H. Clarke,
Unequal Bargaining Power in the Law of Contract, 49 AUSTL. L.J. 229, 232-33 (1975).
61. Clifford Davis Management Ltd., [1975] 1 W.L.R. at 61.
62. [1985] 1 W.L.R. 173 (Eng. C.A.).
63. [1975] 1 Q.B. 326 (Eng. C.A.).
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envisage that any contract entered into in such circumstances
would, without more, be reviewed by the courts by the objective
criterion of what was reasonable.... The courts would only inter-
fere in exceptional cases where as a matter of common fairness it
was not right that the strong should be allowed to push the weak
against the wall. 64
The criterion supported in this passage focuses on the "stronger"
party's unconscionable behavior rather than on the direct effect of the
imbalance of bargaining powers. A similar approach can be discerned
in Hart v. O'Connor,65 in which property was sold for below market
value by a vendor who was of unsound mind. The purchaser had
been unaware of this condition, however, and no improper behavior
could be attributed to him. Reversing the decision of the New Zea-
land Court of Appeal, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
held that the contract should not be set aside. Lord Brightman sum-
marized this rationale:
If a contract is stigmatized as "unfair," it may be unfair in one of
two ways. It may be unfair by reason of the unfair manner in
which it was brought into existence; a contract induced by undue
influence is unfair in this sense. It will be convenient to call this
"procedural unfairness." It may also, in some contexts, be de-
scribed... as "unfair" by reason of the fact that the terms of the
contract are more favorable to one party than to the other. In or-
der to distinguish this "unfairness" from procedural unfairness, it
will be convenient to call it "contractual imbalance." The two
concepts may overlap. Contractual imbalance may be so extreme
as to raise a presumption of procedural unfairness, such as undue
influence or some other form of victimization. Equity will relieve a
party from a contract which he has been induced to make as a
result of victimization. Equity will not relieve a party from a con-
tract on the ground only that there is contractual imbalance not
amounting to unconscionable dealings.
66
This passage clearly demonstrates the court's disapproval of an un-
conscionability doctrine based merely on the inequality of the parties'
bargaining powers or the "contractual imbalance" reflected in the
terms. An even stronger disagreement with Lord Denning's test is
found in the House of Lords' decision in National Westminster Bank
64. Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd., [1985] 1 W.L.R. at 183 (Dillon, L.J.).
65. [1985] App. Cas. 1000 (P.C.) (appeal taken from N.Z.).
66. Id. at 1017-18 (Brightman, L.J.).
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Ltd. v. Morgan.67
Given the circumstances, it seems unlikely that the English
courts will establish a general doctrine of unconscionability in the
foreseeable future. Undoubtedly, a contract could be set aside or pos-
sibly modified by a court where the weaker party was induced to enter
into the contract by means such as undue influence, economic duress,
or misrepresentation. But intervention on the basis of what was de-
scribed by Lord Brightman as "contractual imbalance" appears un-
likely except in isolated cases. Furthermore, there is no suggestion
that an English court would be willing to rely on the concept of un-
conscionability in order to stop a party from exercising its contractual
rights in a harsh or oppressive manner. The doctrine will continue to
operate only in its traditional areas, such as in consumer credit con-
tracts68 or the granting of relief against penalty clauses.
Further, it is unlikely that the legislature will initiate the intro-
duction of a general unconscionability doctrine. The Unfair Contract
Terms Act of 197769 ("Unfair Terms Act") indicates that unconscio-
nability concepts will continue to be invoked, if at all, on a piecemeal
basis. While a detailed analysis of the Unfair Terms Act is outside the
scope of this Article, a short review is appropriate.
The title of the Unfair Terms Act creates a misleading impres-
sion regarding its scope. The Unfair Terms Act does not provide a
remedy against all unfair contractual terms. Its primary function is to
protect consumers70 against clauses that either exonerate one party
from liability for negligence or the non-performance of the contract,
or that restrict this liability. In certain cases involving death or per-
sonal injuries resulting from negligence, the exemption clause is ren-
dered ineffective. 71 In other cases, the clause is enforceable only if it is
67. [1985] 1 App. Cas. 686, 708 (appeal taken from Eng.).
68. The doctrine of unconscionability replaced the provisions of the Money-Lenders Act
in consumer credit transactions.
69. Unfair Contract Terms Act, 1977, ch. 50 (U.K.) [hereinafter Unfair Terms Act]. The
Unfair Terms Act followed in the wake of THE LAW COMMISSION AND THE SCOTTISH LAW
COMMISSION, EXEMPTION CLAUSES: SECOND REPORT (Law Com. No. 69; Scot. Law Com.
No. 39).
70. See Unfair Terms Act, supra note 69, §§ 3, 4, 6(2), 7(2) (applicable only when one
party is dealing as a consumer), 12 (defining the phrase "deals as consumer"), 5 (applicable
only where goods are in consumer use); cf. id. §§ 2 (concerning exemption from negligence),
6(3), 7(3) (concerning certain warranties in nonconsumer transactions), 8 (concerning misrep-
resentations). For dealings as consumers, see Rasbora Ltd. v. J.C.L. Marine Ltd., [1977] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 645 (Eng. Q.B.); R. & B. Customs Brokers Co. v. United Dominions Trust Ltd.,
[1988] 1 W.L.R. 321 (Eng. C.A.) (holding that a firm can deal as a consumer).
71. See Unfair Terms Act, supra note 69, §§ 2(1), 6(1) (concerning an exclusion of the
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"reasonable. ' 72 The Unfair Terms Act provides guidelines for deter-
mining the reasonableness of a clause. Factors to be considered in-
clude the relative strength of the parties' bargaining positions;
whether the customer received an inducement to agree to the term or
had an opportunity to enter into a similar contract without the offend-
ing clause with another person; and whether the customer knew or
should have known of the existence of the exemption clause.
73
It is clear that the new Unfair Terms Act applies mainly to ex-
emption clauses in standard form contracts. Further, its scope is pri-
marily confined to clauses involving "business liability. ' 74 However,
an exception is provided by section 8, which governs clauses purport-
ing to exempt a party from liability for misrepresentation. 75 Section 8
has a general scope of application and renders such clauses effective
only where they are reasonable.
76
There is an obvious conceptual similarity between the "reasona-
bleness" test of the Unfair Terms Act and the "harsh and unconscion-
able" doctrine of the Money-Lenders Act, which was applied to harsh
and unfair credit contracts under sections 134 through 137 of the
Consumer Credit Act. Moreover, both acts focus on the offending
clause and ignore the manner in which it is utilized by the stronger
party. In addition, each of the acts only applies the unconscionability
concept to specified types of contractual clauses. The major distinc-
tion between the two systems pertains to the remedy. The Money-
Lenders Act confers on the courts the discretion to reshape an uncon-
scionable bargain. 77 In contrast, the Unfair Terms Act renders an
warranty of title), 6(2), 7(2) (involving the exclusion of the common law warranties in con-
sumer transactions); see also Phillips Products Ltd. v. Hyland, [1987] 1 W.L.R. 659 (Eng.
C.A.). But see Neptune Orient Lines Ltd. v. J.V.C. (U.K.) Ltd., [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 438
(Q.B. Comm'l Ct.); Thompson v. T. Lohan (Plant Hire) Ltd., [1987] 1 W.L.R. 649 (Eng. C.A.)
(placing restrictions on excluding a clause).
72. See Unfair Terms Act, supra note 69, §§ 2(2) (concerning exclusion of liability for
negligence resulting in damage to property), 3 (concerning exemption clauses pertaining to the
performance of contractual duties), 6(3), 7(3) (concerning the exclusion of the common law
warranties in non-consumer transactions).
73. See id. § 11 & sched. 2. For cases applying the test, see R.W. Greene Ltd. v. Cade
Bros. Farms, [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 602 (Eng. Q.B.); George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd. v.
Finey Lock Seeds Ltd., [1983] 2 App. Cas. 803 (appeal taken from Eng.); Singer Co. (U.K.) v.
Tees and Hartlepool Port Auth., [1988] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 164 (Eng. Q.B. Comm'l Ct.); Smith v.
Eric S. Bush, [1989] 2 All. E.R. 514 (Eng. H.L.).
74. Unfair Terms Act, supra note 69, § 1(3).
75. Id. § 8(1).
76. See id.
77. See Money-Lenders Act, supra note 31.
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offending clause inoperable. 78 The departure of the Unfair Terms Act
from the spirit of unconscionability suggests that a general doctrine of
this type, which would be applicable across the board, is not currently
favored by the legislature. 79
C. Unconscionability in French Law
The treatment of unconscionable contracts at French law is to-
day affected by the basic principles of the French Civil Code and by
the case law that has developed around specific consumer protection
legislation of recent years. These recent developments are discussed
later in this section.
In the nineteenth century, the dominant principles were freedom
of contract and protection of family property. The first principle,
freedom of contract, supports the sanctity of contract in the same
manner as it does in English law. The second principle, protection of
family property, pulls in the opposite direction for reasons similar to
those that led English courts to set aside unconscionable bargains
with expectant heirs.
Freedom of contract is articulated in article 1134 of the French
Civil Code: "An agreement legally entered into is law for those who
made it. ' 's ° When parties enter into a contract, they are in fact legis-
lating for themselves. Provided they legislate in a manner compatible
with positive law, they are free to make and enforce against each
other whatever bargains they wish. Contractual freedom has, there-
fore, been given a high place in the French system. At a practical
level, however, it is essential to see what limitations positive law and
procedures place on this freedom. The existence in article 1134 of the
rule that contracts "must be performed in good faith" ' gives a gen-
eral hint as to the sort of controls the law exercises over contractual
undertakings.
The second principle, protection of family property, is more diffi-
cult to isolate. It is, however, explicitly expounded in the rules re-
garding the sale of immoveable property and the sharing of a
succession. It is also implicit in the rules relating to the compulsory
78. See Unfair Terms Act, supra note 69.
79. Presumably, concern exists about the wide discretion that an unconscionability doc-
trine, based on the reshaping of a bargain by judicial decision, confers on the courts.
80. C. civ. art. 1134 (Fr.) ("Les conventions 16galement form6es tiennent lieu de loi i
ceux qui les ont faites."), translated in THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE AS AMENDED TO 1976 (John
H. Crabb trans., 1977).
81. Id. ("[Les conventions] doivent &re execut -s de bonne foi."); see also id. art. 1135.
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portion of an heir in a succession, the bias against gifts, the traditional
rules of civil delict, and the law of quasi-contract. The French Civil
Code's emphasis is not so much on the assiduous protection of the
property of an individual, but rather on the protection and mainte-
nance of family property. Even though wealth may have changed its
general character from immoveable to moveable assets, the French
Civil Code's principle remains the same. The abiding theme remains
the keeping of balance between patrimonies and the retention of
wealth within a narrow family group.
The somewhat uneasy coexistence of the two principles of con-
tractual freedom and property protection has left its mark on the
French law of contract. For a discussion of the problems that arise
and of ways of handling unconscionability, the rules relating to the
formation of a contract provide a convenient beginning. These rules
on formation are found, along with the other general contractual
rules, in title 3 of book 3 of the French Civil Code, which is entitled
"On different ways of acquiring property. '8 2 Book 3 emphasizes
property notions. Article 711,83 the introductory article to book 3,
ties those notions of property to obligations. Contracts as voluntary
obligations are thus directly affected.
Article 110884 provides a base for the bargaining stance of the
contracting parties and, from an unconscionability point of view, in-
troduces requirements of equality. Parties to a contract must have
capacity, they must agree to the obligation placed on them, their obli-
gation must relate to definable property, and there must be a lawful
cause or reason for them to undertake the obligation contracted.
These requirements themselves are protective of the positions of the
parties; the actual application of the rules is, in general, even more
protective.
The French Civil Code elaborates the rules relating to formation
in articles 1109 through 1133. Initially, it deals with the question of
agreement. No agreement occurs where the consent has been ob-
82. Id. bk. 3 ("Des diffrrentes mani~res dont on acquiert la propri6.").
83. "Ownership is acquired and transferred by succession, by donation inter vivos, by
will, and by a contract." Id. art. 711 ("La propri6t6 des biens s'acquiert et se transmet par
succession, par donation entre vifs ou testamentaire, et par I'effet des obligations.").
84. "In order that a contract should be valid, it must comply with four conditions. There
must be consent by the party bound; the person must be capable of contracting; the subject
matter of the contract must be certain; the "cause" of the contract must be lawful." Id. art.
1108 ("Quatre conditions sont essentielles pour la validitE d'une convention: Le consentement
de la partie qui s'oblige; Sa capacit6 de contracter; Un objet certain qui forme la mati~re de
l'engagement; Une cause licite dans I'obligation.").
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tained by mistake, duress, or fraud.8 5 The effect of the French Civil
Code's rules is that where the parties enter into an agreement without
full and fair knowledge of what is involved, the property of each party
is protected. In these cases, the contracts are held to be ineffective.
Also falling under the rubric of consent is lision. s6 Ldsion is usually
dealt with as the loss that results from a serious imbalance or dispro-
portion in the reciprocal obligations of the parties to a contract.
8 7
Where applicable, its effect, as with the other consensus factors, is to
annul the party's consent to enter into the contract.
The only other general control on contractual freedom recog-
nized in the French Civil Code is the rule prohibiting the enforcement
of contracts that are contrary to public policy;s8 this is, in a sense, a
separate rule that is independent both of the protection of private
property and the emphasis on freedom of contract.8 9
The manner in which unconscionable contracts fit into the basic
civil law scheme has been outlined. Obviously, with the exception of
lision, which is a narrower concept than might be expected, the
French Civil Code has no specific provision directly on point.
During the Middle Ages, ldsion became a general doctrine in Eu-
rope. It extended to the sale of moveables as well as immoveables,
and in some cases protected purchasers. Although some modem legal
systems have retained the medieval generalized notion,9° France,
85. Id. art. 1109. The three vitiating elements are erreur, violence, and dol; articles 1110,
1111-1115, and 1116 elaborate on each of these elements respectively.
86. This doctrine is derived from the laesio enormis of Roman Law. See CODE J. 4.44.2,
.8. Under it, the seller of immoveable property who received less than half its value could
recover the property on return of the price received, or receive a reasonable supplement in
price from the purchaser.
87. "There is lision when the price of goods or a service, as stated in a contract, is signifi-
cantly out of relation to the objective market value of those goods or that service." BORIS
STARCK, DROIT CIVIL-OBLIGATIONs 479 (1972) ("II y a lesion lorsque le prix d'un bien ou
d'un service, tel qu'il a &6 fix6 dans le contrat, s'61oigne sensiblement de la valeur v6nale,
objective, de ce bien ou de ce service.").
88. C. civ. arts. 6, 1133; cf KONSTANTIN SIMiTrs, GUTE SrrrEN UND ORDRE PUBLIC
(1960); BGB art. 138, translated in THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE AS AMENDED TO JANUARY 1,
1975 (Ian S. Forrester et al. trans., 1975).
89. This rule supports the other rules restricting contractual freedom, but does not in
itself provide property protection.
90. Article 1448 of Italy's Civil Code is typical:
If there is a disproportion between the performance of one party and that of another,
and such disproportion was the result of a state of need of one party, or which the
other has availed himself for his advantage, the injured party can demand rescission
of the contract. The action is not admissible if the lesion does not exceed one-half of
the value that the performance made or promised by the damaged party had at the
time of the contract.
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through article 1118 of the Civil Code, generally restricts the con-
cept's range of application. Article 1118 states that lision will only
serve to nullify an agreement in the case of certain specified contracts
or as between certain specified classes of people.91 Examples of such
special cases are minors' contracts and contracts for the sale of im-
moveables. In the first situation, lMsion permits a person under eight-
een to rescind a contract if he has suffered or has been disadvantaged
by it.92 Articles 1674 through 1685 of the French Civil Code govern
the concept of lesion in real property contracts. 93 Under these arti-
cles, as elsewhere, the operation of ldsion does not depend on the in-
tention or knowledge of the stronger party. The rule directly protects
property and prohibits the sale of immoveables for a price of less than
seven-twelfths of their value.
In view of the narrow scope of article 1118,9 unconscionable
transactions could only be combated successfully by judicial interven-
tion. Lision could not explicitly provide the basis for an unconsciona-
bility concept. The courts have therefore been forced to grant relief in
cases that might otherwise have been decided on the basis of a general
doctrine of lision by employing other rules and principles. For exam-
ple, they have used the rules on mistake liberally where the considera-
tions furnished by the parties were grossly disproportionate. In this
type of case, the unconscionable element in the transaction has been
used to establish the weaker party's lack of consent.95
CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 1448, translated in THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE (Mario Beltramo et
al. trans., 1991). Though France had a general doctrine of ldsion before the Revolution, the
direct inspiration for Italian Civil Code article 1448 is more likely article 138 of the German
Civil Code. Most European jurisdictions on the French model, however, have an even less
extensive notion of ldsion than does France. Spain, for instance, admitted only two cases of
ldsion through the Spanish Civil Code, the Cddigo Civil [C.CIV.] arts. 1291, 1293 (those involv-
ing the property of incapacitated persons and absentees). Equally, what amounts to lision
varies; a fairly common figure is a disproportion of a quarter less than current market value.
This is also the test prescribed by article 887 of the French Civil Code in relation to the
division of an inheritance. C. cIv. art. 887.
91. C. civ. art. 1118 ("La l6sion ne vicie les conventions que dans certains contrats ou i
16gard de certaines personnes, ainsi qu'il sera expliqu6 [aux articles 1304 i 1314 du present
Code].").
92. Id. arts. 1304-14.
93. Id. arts. 1674-85.
94. In addition, however, to the specific examples in the French Civil Code striking down
arrangements when there is a disproportionate effect on the patrimonies of the parties, there
are other legislative enactments providing against ldsion, including Loi 67-545 du 9 Juillet 1967
[Law 67-545 of July 9, 1967], 1967 J.O. 6867(l), 1967 D.S.L. 258-60; Loi du 8 Juillet 1907
[Law of July 8, 1907], 2 Sirey Lois Annot6es 238-40.
95. See Judgment of May 4, 1956, Cass. civ. soc., 1957 Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 313 note
P. Malaurie (Fr.); see also 6 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT, TRAIT1i PRATIQUE DE
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In other cases, the definition of violence was extended beyond
outright physical coercion to various types of mental pressure to help
meet the needs of those affected by clearly unconscionable transac-
tions.96 In still other cases, the courts have decided that unconsciona-
ble bargains should be invalidated on the ground that the gross
imbalance in the value of the promises exchanged involved a partial
or total absence of cause. An interesting illustration of this is fur-
nished by a case in which the owner of some land and chattels sold his
property in return for an inadequate support and sustenance allow-
ance.97 In setting aside the contract, the court observed:
At law, the price is one of the essential and constitutive elements of
a sale and it is the court's duty to declare that this element is ab-
sent in a sale when, in the court's assessment, the income from the
thing sold is in itself sufficient to cover the buyer's obligations to
the vendor .... 98
This principle has become known as the doctrine of the derisory price.
As a derisory price is no price at all, there is simply no contract of
sale. It is difficult to determine at what stage a price ceases to be
derisory and begins to be lesionary, and hence adequate to constitute
a cause. However, once the price is no longer derisory, the courts are
prohibited from controlling the transaction. A recent case illustrates
the difficulty. 99 In that case, the contract concerned Catalan frescoes
that had been sold by illiterate peasants for AF 300,00000 to someone
who knew that their true value was inestimable. At first instance, the
sale was set aside, the court clearly being influenced by the circum-
stances and by the gross disproportion in the values given by the par-
ties. The Court of Cassation quashed the decision because the lower
court had explicitly referred to "the exceptional value" of the fres-
coes. This suggested that the trial judge had resorted to the doctrine
of ldsion, which, in light of article 1118, was inapplicable. 10' Had the
judge instead explicitly decided to regard the price as "derisory," the
DROIT CIVIL 259 (2d ed. 1952-60); 3 HENRI MAZEAUD, LEOONS DE DROIT CIVIL para. 893
(2d ed. 1966); STARCK, supra note 87, para. 1616.
96. See. e.g., Judgment of Feb. 20, 1988, Cass. req., 1988 Recueil Sirey [D.P.] I 263 (Fr.)
(where the external forces affecting the free consent of a shipwrecked mariner were sand bars
and a rising tide).
97. Judgment of May 27, 1908, Cass. req., 1908 Recueil Dalloz [D.P.] I 480 (Fr.).
98. Id.
99. Judgment of Jan. 25, 1965, Cass. civ. Ire, 1965 Recueil Dalloz [D.S. Jur.] 217 (Fr.).
100. This amounts to approximately $600 in the United States.
101. See supra note 83.
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decision might well have been upheld.
0 2
The courts have also attempted to use ideas of a lesionary nature,
though in a different guise, in some specific branches of the law of
contract. One major area of attack was in the field of agents'
charges. a0 3 Initially, the courts controlled these charges under article
19861° of the French Civil Code, which states that "agency is gratui-
tous unless there is agreement to the contrary."' 0 5 This, however, was
a patently bad argument. By 1913, the courts had concluded that
they had a general power to control such charges under article 1134
and the general clauses on agency, articles 1984 through 2002. Thus,
in a relevant case, l0 6 the courts reduced the fee charged by an agent
who had negotiated the sale of a factory from F6,000 to F2,000. In
1957, the same rule was applied to fees charged by arbitrators. 0 7 The
court explained that "[a]n arbitration contract is an agency agreement
and therefore the fees of the arbitrators are those of agents and as
such are within the discretionary power of judges to control and vary
by reducing the fees in proportion to the services rendered."' 08
Finally, the French Civil Code controls unconscionable contracts
by proscribing certain types of transactions that are particularly prone
to being used for usurious purposes. Two examples reveal the opera-
tion of this control. Article 2078109 of the French Civil Code provides
that a pledgee may not, on default by the pledgor, ipso facto appropri-
ate to himself the pledged goods. The second example of protection is
102. Dol may equally have been a successful plea for the naive vendors.
103. In the field of professional fees and charges, the courts have been similarly active.
The public nature of the function that many professions fulfill has been a relevant factor and
has assisted the courts in finding a secure basis for their decisions. In the case of notaries and
avoudes, the monopolistic nature of the professions also influenced judicial reasoning. The
Judgment of June 13, 1910, Cass. req., 1910 Recueil Daloz [D.P.] II 368 (Fr.), involving the
sale of a notary's office, is a good example of this area. In that case, the appellate court held:
"The sale of such an office is a contract sui generis of importance to the public interest which
demands that the price represents the exact value of the office. It is a matter for the sovereign
appreciation of the courts at first instance whether the price is too high and by how much."
Id. Bankers are also included within this general control system.
104. C. civ. art. 1986.
105. Id. ("Le mandat est gratuit, s'il n'y a convention contraire.").
106. Judgment of Mar. 11, 1913, Cass. req., 1913 Recueil Dalloz [D.P.] I 408 (Fr.).
107. Judgment of Feb. 6, 1957, Cour d'appel, Colmar, 1957 Recueil Dalloz [D. Jur.] 206
(Fr.).
108. Id.
109. C. civ. art. 2078 ("Le creincier ne peut, i defaut de payement, disposer du gage:...
Toute clause qui autoriserait le creincier i s'approprier le gage ou A en disposer sans les
formaliteg ci-dessus, est nulle.").
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the debtor's right of repurchase, the vente d reme're.11° The vente d
remdrd allows the vendor to retain a right to repurchase the goods.
Upon exercising this right, the vendor must return the price paid and
reimburse the purchaser for the various incidental costs of the sale.
Through this type of sale, the vendor can raise money in times of
need. Its advantages over typical financing arrangements are that the
vendor may get the full value of the property that would have other-
wise been given as security for a part-value loan, and also that the
vendor retains the possibility of repossessing the property when his
finances improve. Though the purchaser is not entitled to interest on
the amount paid to the vendor, the purchaser does have the benefit of
the property's revenue from sale until repurchase. Article 1673 ex-
plicitly sets forth the nature of the debtor's reimbursement."' The
French Civil Code limits the period for repurchase to five years. 112
Courts generally construe sales with a right of repurchase nar-
rowly. The parties may provide in an agreement that the purchase
money received is less than the stipulated sale-repurchase price. A
court may, however, intervene to protect the seller on the basis that
the sale is in fact a loan in violation of usury laws. A court is also
likely to intervene in certain sale and lease-back transactions. If, for
instance, the lease of property back to the vendor follows immediately
after sale and the purchaser commonly makes purchase and lease-
back sales, the court will treat the contract as a secured loan disguised
as a sale in order to prevent the vendor from evading pledge or hy-
pothecation laws.
Outside of these French Civil Code provisions exists an impor-
tant body of law on clauses abusives and some specific commercial
contracts that usually require protective measures. Typical examples
of the latter are credit sale transactions and contracts in restraint of
trade. The French have acted predictably with respect to both in-
stances, tending to favor protecting the purchaser and the economic
freedom of the restrained party, respectively.
The law on credit sales is found in the Decree of May 20, 1955,
as supplemented by the Ordinance of June 30, 1945 and the Decree of
110. Id. arts. 1658-73.
111. Id. art. 1673 ("The seller who implements an agreement for repurchase must reim-
burse the purchaser not only for the sale price but also for the senses and reasonable costs of
the sale, for necessary repairs to the property, and for those that have increased the value of
the property up to the amount of that increase.").
112. Id. art. 1660.
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August 4, 1956.113 These laws deal with all sales involving credit ar-
rangements, provide minimum sums in down payment for various
classes of goods, and set maximum periods for payment of the unpaid
balance of the purchase price. They further require that the vendor in
a credit sale give the purchaser full details in writing of the transac-
tion into which he is entering. In practice, creditors often seek by
express contractual provision to bypass the general law, such as arti-
cle 1184, requiring notice and time for payment to be given before
termination of the credit sale agreement." 4 Such clauses have many
advantages for creditors, but are not favored by the courts. Thus,
courts interpret such clauses restrictively, and, if possible, will hold
that the clause refers back to article 1184 and will apply the general
law. Alternatively, courts may investigate the circumstances of the
purchaser's acceptance or test the contract for usury.
Contracts in restraint of trade are valid on the general grounds of
freedom of contract.' '5 However, this generalization is subject to cer-
tain restrictions. The principal limits, based on the economic freedom
of the individual, require that a clause restraining competition must
not provide an excessive or unnecessary restriction on another basic
freedom. Thus, clauses that restrict trade in all countries of the world
would fail. To be valid, any restraint must have specific terms and be
limited in time or space. "16 Any unreasonable restraint is void on the
grounds of public policy.
Unconscionability is expressly and rigidly controlled in France in
the area of usury law." 7 The biblical directions of the Old and New
113. C. civ. art. 7.
114. C. civ. art. 1184 ("A resolutory condition is always presumed in a bilateral contract
for the case where one of the parties does not fulfill their obligations. In such a case the
contract is not terminated ipso jure. The party in respect of whom the obligation has not been
fulfilled has the choice either of compelling the fulfillment of the obligation where that is possi-
ble or of seeking termination with damages. Termination must be requested by formal process
and the defendant may, depending on the circumstances, be granted time to perform.").
115. The general contractual freedom to restrain commercial competition. is supported by
the delictual rules on unfair competition. They will operate to protect a trader even where the
protective clause contractually negotiated is nullified or where the competitive activity is tech-
nically outside the sphere of operation of the contract term. Such would be the case for a
trader who sets up business beyond the contractually restricted geographical area but improp-
erly solicits the competitor's clients from within the restricted area.
116. Judgment of Feb. 4, 1970, Cass. com., 1970 Recueil Dalloz [D.S. Jur.] 462 (Fr.).
117. The legal rate of interest, applicable in the absence of agreement by the parties, is set
annually by decree. See Law of July 11, 1975, 1975 D.L. 619, as amended by Law of June 23,
1989, 1989 D.L. 421. Article 1907 of the French Civil Code provides that parties may con-
tract for interest rates that exceed the legal rates. The freedom is, however, subject to article
1907 and two conditions: that the agreed rate does not exceed any statutorily prescribed limit
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Testaments influenced early French thinking regarding usury. From
1789 to 1807, interest rates were left unregulated. Low limits for in-
terest rates were set in 1807, and continued in force until 1886 in
commercial matters, and until 1918 in civil matters. These controls
were followed by a period of freedom that ended in 1935. The law of
August 8, 1935, introduced an extremely flexible test of unconsciona-
bility.118 The standard used to determine the maximum conscionable
rate of interest was the average rate charged by lenders in good faith
in transactions involving the same risk as the impugned contract.11 9
Problems of proof made this test impracticable. Thus, it was rarely
used and was finally repealed in 1975.120
The Law on Usury of December 28, 1966,121 established the cur-
rent law.122 The new system covers not only loans of an ordinary
nature, but also affects installment sales and hire-purchase transac-
tions. In calculating the rate of interest provided by an agreement,
the courts are instructed by article 3 to take into account not only the
interest expressly stated in the contract, but also all fees, commissions,
and other payments, whether of a direct or indirect nature, involved
in obtaining the loan. Whatever the apparent nature of a transaction,
courts are empowered to go beyond the stated purpose in order to
discern its true nature and to discover if it is a disguised loan. The
penal sanctions are formidable and operate against all who participate
in the charging of a usurious rate.
The French legislature formulated a specific enactment on usury.
However, because of the nature of usurious practices, commentators
have interpreted the usury laws as another, albeit special, aspect of a
general theory against lesionary transactions. That view is helpful in
on interest rates, and that the agreed rate is stipulated in writing. For 1991, the legal rate was
fixed at 10.26%.
118. Decree on Usury, 1934 D.P. IV 225.
119. Id. art. 1.
120. 1975 D.L. 619 art. 5.
121. 1966 D.L. 1010.
122. This provides for a maximum effective rate that must not, at the time of contracting,
exceed by more than 30% the mean rate charged in the preceding quarter by lending finance
institutions for similar transactions involving similar risk, as defined by Ministerial order given
after consultation with the National Credit Council. The civil sanction for charging a usurious
rate is not nullity but a reduction of interest. Article 5 of the Law on Usury provides:
[W]here a contractual loan is usurious, money paid in excess of the lawful amount is
ipso jure set off against any ordinary interest then due and subsidiarily against princi-
pal. If the debt is thereby extinguished both as to principal and interest, any money
improperly received which remains must be returned to the borrower with interest at




the present context as it connects the present statute with the earlier
analysis of the general law. In both, the law intervenes in a private
contractual relationship largely because of the grossly disproportion-
ate bargaining positions of the parties. The law does this to maintain
a reasonable equilibrium between their patrimonies.
Major development of case law in the late 1980s and early 1990s
overshadows these specific legislative rules. Building on the consumer
protection law of 1978 on clauses abusives and on the legislative policy
implicit in that law, the Court of Cassation appears, with its decision
of May 14, 1991, to have established a general rule effecting the nul-
lity of clauses abusives in contracts. 123
The French statute of January 10, 1978, was enacted "for the
protection of consumers against unconscionable clauses" and aimed
at striking down clauses imposed on consumers by "an abuse of the
economic power of the other party and which give that party an ex-
cessive advantage."'' 24 This forbade any abuse of position by one
party that affected the exercise of the will of the other. It was not
limited to contracts of a particular type or a particular form, nor only
to contracts for goods, services, or real property. As Ghestin stated in
commenting on the statute, "This law.., introduces for the first time,
for the benefit of consumers, provisions of a general kind which could
apply to all contracts."'
25
Significantly, the law left the definition of the specific types of
clauses affected to subordinate legislation. The Conseil d'Etat, acting
on the recommendation of the Commission on Unconscionable
Clauses, duly prescribed some clauses by the Decree of March 24,
1978.126 There have been no further decrees to extend the application
of the statute. The courts, however, have been active, and the culmi-
nation of this activity is the decision of the Court of Cassation of May
14, 1991.127
In that decision, the first civil chamber of the court, following the
thrust of its own earlier decisions, upheld the judgment of the lower
123. The statute in question is the Law of January 10, 1978, 1978 D.L. 86. Valuable
commentary on the law, its history, and its application can be found in 2 JACQUES GHESTIN,
TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL 270 (2d ed. 1988). The judgment of the Court of Cassation is re-
ported in the Judgment of May 14, 1991, Cass. civ. Ire, 1991 Recueil Dallez-Sirey [D.S. Jur.]
449 note Jacques Ghestin (Fr.).
124. 1978 D.L. 86 art. 35.
125. GHESTIN, supra note 123, at 671.
126. 1975 D.L. 509.
127. Judgment of May 4, 1991, Cass. civ. Ire, 1991 Recueil Dalloz-Sirey [D.S. Jur.] 449
(Fr.).
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court that had found abusive the clause in a contract for the develop-
ment of a film that excluded all responsibility of the laboratory for
loss of the film. The clause in question was not one of those listed in
the Decree of 1978. The Court of Cassation held that "the clause
obtained an excessive advantage for the defendant company ... and
that the latter by virtue of its economic position was able to impose
the condition on its clientele." 1 28 The judgment does not refer ex-
pressly to any particular law, though it uses the language of the stat-
ute of 1978. It does, however, clearly treat unconscionable clauses as
void whether or not they are covered by a specific decree.
In generalizing the rules on clauses abusives in this way, the deci-
sion allows expansion of the law to protect against unfair contract
clauses generally. Ghestin, in his note on the judgment, suggests that
public policy may well justify the rule.129 The court need only
broaden its interpretation slightly to apply this rule to parties who are
not consumers.
In summary, the earliest controls on freedom of contract in
France were property controls, which were augmented over the years
by usury laws and by increasingly broad rules. Currently, in the field
of unconscionable clauses at least, the courts have been willing to con-
trol improvident and disproportionate bargains.
The French, then, like the English, have a number of specific
rules relating to unconscionability, and although they have no general
lesionary doctrine, they are moving rapidly toward a general rule on
unconscionability. In contrast, German law, as discussed in the next
section, has already developed a general doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity. However, it is significant that the German Civil Code was
promulgated a century after the French Civil Code.
D. Unconscionability in German Law130
Unlike English and French law, the German Civil Code, the
Btirgerliches Gesetzbuch ("BGB"), contains three general provisions
pertaining to unconscionability: articles 138, 242, and 826.131 Article
128. Id. at 449.
129. Id. note Jacques Ghestin (Fr.).
130. For an excellent and detailed treatment of the subject in English, see John P.
Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041 (1976).
131. BGB arts. 138, 242, 826, translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE AS
ENACTED ON AUGUST 18, 1896 WITH THE INTRODUCTORY STATUTE ENACTED ON THE
SAME DATE (Walter Loewy trans., 1909). All translations of paragraphs of the German Code
cited in this Article are taken from this text. For a discussion of this provision in English, see
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138 combats bargains that are either contrary to public policy or un-
conscionable. Article 242 requires the observance of good faith in the
performance of bargains. Finally, article 826, a particularly general
provision, prohibits the misuse of rights by one person for the purpose
of damaging another.
Article 826 is not included among the provisions on the law of
contract; it constitutes, in effect, a principle of the law of torts. This is
clear from its language: "A person who wilfully causes damage to
another in a manner contrary to public policy is bound to compensate
the other for the damage.' 32 Because the article is based on tort law,
it is outside the scope of this Article. The other two provisions, arti-
cles 138 and 242, require a more detailed analysis.
Article 138, which is included in the General Part of the BGB,
reads:
(1) A legal transaction which is contrary to public policy is void.
(2) A legal transaction is also void whereby a person exploiting the
need, carelessness or inexperience of another, causes to be prom-
ised or granted to himself or to a third party in exchange for a
performance, pecuniary advantages which exceed the value of the
performance to such an extent that, under the circumstances, the
pecuniary advantages are in obvious disproportion to the
performance. 33
Subsection 2, which originated in the Usury Law of 1880, was not
included in the original draft of the BGB. 134 It was added during the
BGB's revision, 35 reflecting, in all probability, the progressive ideas
Vera Bolgir, Abuse of Rights in France, Germany and Switzerland: A Survey of a Recent Chap-
ter in Legal Doctrine, 35 LA. L. REV. 1015 (1975).
132. BGB art. 826.
133. Id. art. 138. The provision was amended by the Erste Gesetz zur Bekimpfung der
Wirtscharftskriminalitiit (First Law on the Combating of Commercial Crime) [I. WikG] 1976
BGBI.I 2034. The second paragraph now states that a legal transaction is void when a person
exploits "the distressed situation, inexperience, lack of judgmental ability or grave weakness of
will of another to obtain the grant or promise of pecuniary advantages for himself or a third
party which are obviously disproportionate to the performance given in return." Id., trans-
lated in ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW
SYSTEM 1188, 1209 (2d ed. 1977). The amendment aimed to widen the scope of the provision,
but the basic framework appears to have remained unaltered. There remains a need for the
exploitation of a "weakness" of one party by the other, who must make a "disproportionate"
gain. Cf. A. Muiller-Emmert & B. Maier, Das Erste Gesetz zur Bek'mpfung der Wirtschaft-
skriminalitdt, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1657, 1664 (1976); R. Sturm, Die
Neufassung des Wuchertatbestandes und die Grenzen des Strafrechts, JURISTENZEITUNG 84
(1977) (both dealing mainly with the criminal law aspects of the new Act).
134. 1 BENNO MUGDAN, DIE GESAMMTEN MATERIALIEN ZUM BGB 1013 (1899).
135. It appears to have been added at the stage of the deliberations of the 12th Commis-
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at the end of the nineteenth century. The clause is known as the
"usury [Wucher] clause," and goes far toward establishing a general
concept of unconscionability. However, it includes a two-tiered limi-
tation. First, the clause applies only where one party to the contract
has exploited, or made use of, the need, carelessness, or inexperience
of the other. Second, it is confined to cases in which there is an obvi-
ous or striking disparity in the value of the respective undertakings of
the two parties.
The German courts have given the terms "need," "carelessness,"
and "inexperience" a restrictive construction. "Need" has been held
to exist where a person's economic or financial position is subject to
an immediate and direct threat, such as a landowner's need to raise
finance in order to prevent a foreclosure sale of his or her mortgaged
property. 36 Other types of necessity, such as one arising from a
threat to a person's health or well-being, do not constitute "need"
within the meaning of article 138(2).137 Moreover, the state of neces-
sity must be one that leaves the debtor with no choice but to go ahead
with the unequal bargain. This occurs mainly where the debtor faces
the danger of economic collapse or the loss of an important asset, but
not where the debtor's "need" arises with respect to a transaction in-
volving the expansion of a business or the acquisition of a new asset.
Thus, in a case decided in 1957 by the Bundesgerichtshof,3 a busi-
nessman who sought to expand his business in a town where an acute
shortage of leasehold property existed entered into an onerous lease.
In this lease, he pledged not to raise any claims concerning the state of
the premises. 139 The court held that this case did not involve "need"
within the meaning of article 138(2), as there had been no imminent
threat to the businessman's existing economic position.
14
"Carelessness" or "foolhardiness" within the meaning of article
138(2) occurs when a person enters into a bargain without attempting
sion of the Reichstag (the lower house of the German parliament) in June 1896. The debate in
the Reichstag appears to have been heated. See id. at 969-70, 1003.
136. Judgment of May 1, 1911, Reichsgericht [RG], 60 Entscheidungen des Reichsger-
ichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 9; 1 DAs BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH-KOMMENTAR VON
REICHSRICHTERN UND BUNDESRICHTERN pt. 1, at 445 (1 1th ed.) [hereinafter BGB-RGRK];
cf. Dawson, supra note 130, at 1057.
137. Judgment of June 1, 1970, BGH, 54 BGHZ 165, 175.
138. The Bundesgerichtshof is the highest court of appeals for civil matters.
139. Judgment of May 21, 1957, Bundesgerichshof, 10 Neue juristische Wochenschrift
[NJW] 1274.
140. Id. (where the tenant signed a contract in which he undertook not to raise any claims
relating to the condition of the premises).
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to assess its implications and consequences.1 4' The carelessness must
relate directly to the transactions in question. "Inexperience" may
relate either to a general lack of business sophistication or to igno-
rance of the particular trade in question. Dawson cites an interesting
case concerning both carelessness and inexperience. 142 In that case, a
retired railroad inspector paid a patentee an exorbitant amount for
the exclusive franchise to sell lighting equipment in a foreign country.
The court set aside the contract on the ground of the inspector's inex-
perience, although all of elements of carelessness were also present.
Presumably, the court resolved to rest its decision on "inexperience"
in view of the stigma attached to a finding of "foolhardiness."'1 43 An-
other case concerned a bargain between a father and his children from
his first marriage, who had just come of age. As the bargain conferred
a disproportionate benefit on the father and his second wife, the court
set it aside on the ground of the children's inexperience. 44 A court
applying English law would, undoubtedly, have reached the same
conclusion by invoking the doctrine of undue influence.
The mere "need, .... carelessness," or "inexperience" of the
weaker party is not, by itself, a sufficient ground for setting aside a
bargain. The stronger party must have exploited or traded upon this
weakness. Courts interpret the word "exploitation" more broadly
than the words "need," "carelessness," and "inexperience." It is not
necessary to establish that the stronger party intended to exploit the
weakness in question or even had a hand in creating it. Rather, it is
sufficient to show that the stronger party was familiar with the facts.
Thus, there is "exploitation" where the stronger party takes advan-
tage of a known weakness of the other party.1 45
It follows that, while a finding of need, carelessness, or inexperi-
ence must be based on the actual circumstances of the weaker party,
the existence of exploitation depends upon the stronger party's state
of mind. In other words, whether or not the stronger party has ex-
ploited a "weakness" depends on a subjective test. In contrast, the
second requirement of article 138(2) of the BGB, providing relief
141. See BGB-RGRK, supra note 136, at 446.
142. Judgment of Jan. 15, 1930 RG, 24 Leipziger Zeitschrift 652, cited in Dawson, supra
note 130, at 1060-61.
143. See id.
144. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1936, RG, 66 JW 25.
145. Judgment of Jan. 7, 1905, RG, 60 RGZ 9; Judgment of Mar. 6, 1915, RG, 86 RGZ
300; Judgment of Feb. 2, 1951, BGH, 4 NJW 397; Judgment of Mar. 25, 1966, BGH, 19 NJW
1451.
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when there is a striking disparity in the value of the considerations
furnished by the parties, is governed by an objective test.
Neither the BGB nor the leading commentaries define the phrase
"obvious disparity." The prevailing view is that whether the consid-
erations furnished by the parties are strikingly disproportionate de-
pends on the circumstances of each case. 146 Thus, in a period of
accelerating inflation, interest rates of ninety-six percent per annum
were held not to involve a strikingly disproportionate gain and there-
fore were not considered usurious. 147 Similarly, a high interest rate
was considered justifiable where a loan was extended in the context of
a speculative transaction.1 48 In ordinary transactions, though, loans
with rates of forty-five percent per annum and of thirty-nine percent
per annum were treated as usurious. 49 Moreover, in cases of this
type, the courts usually consider the rate at which the loan involved
could have been obtained from other sources. A similar analysis,
which compares the transaction under consideration with terms avail-
able elsewhere, applies to sales. Under this test, if the contract price
differs substantially from the market price, the transaction involves an
"obvious disparity" in furnished consideration. However, where
there is no ready market for the goods, the disparity is difficult to
establish. Thus, in one case, a court held that the transaction did not
involve an obvious disparity, although the price amounted to only
two-fifths of the market value.' 50 A 1964 decision of the Bundesger-
ichtshof resolved one important aspect of this method of comparison.
According to the court, any comparison should be based on the prices
in effect at the time the contract is made.15 1
When a transaction runs counter to article 138(2), the contract is
rendered void, so that neither party is under a duty to perform.152 In
146. See BGB-RGRK, supra note 136, at 447.
147. Judgment of Oct. 9, 1926, RG, 1926 Werneyar 151, cited in Dawson, supra note 130,
at 1063.
148. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1909, RG, 38 JW 215; cf. Oldbg, 52 MDR 36 (two percent per
month regarded as permissible). See Dawson, supra note 130, at 1063, for examples where
rates of up to 10% per day were upheld.
149. Judgment of Nov. 11, 1961, BGH, 17 BB 156; Judgment of Feb. 15, 1956, BGH, 11
BB 318. The court held that 90% per annum would, in any event, be excessive or "obviously
disproportionate." Judgment of Feb. 9, 1967, BGH, 76 Der Betrieb 677.
150. Judgment of May 2, 1969, BGH, 1969 Lindenmaier-M6hring 1447.
151. Judgment of May 25, 1964, BGH, 17 NJW 1787.
152. Judgment of Feb. 19, 1904, RG, 57 RGZ 95; Judgment of Oct. 19, 1909, RG, 72
RGZ 63; Judgment of Nov. 18, 1924, RG, 109 RGZ 201. Note that different rules of avoid-




fact, the Reichsgericht, which was the predecessor of the Bundesger-
ichtshof, held that the stronger party had no remedy whatsoever,
which meant that he faced potential losses of both capital and prof-
its.153 This policy changed in 1939, when the same court held that a
lender who had loaned to a borrower at usurious rates was entitled to
recover the amount lent, but not any interest, through an action in
restitution under article 812.154 A similar remedy appears available in
transactions other than loans. A leading commentary suggests that
when a sale is invalidated under article 138(2), the seller is entitled
under article 817 of the BGB to recover the chattels supplied by
him. 15 5 Similar actions in restitution are available to the weaker
party. 156
Article 138(2) has two apparent shortcomings. First, the article
contemplates the avoidance of the entire transaction. This provision
would drastically affect contracts involving several promises, only one
of which violates article 138(2). Fortunately, article 139 provides a
solution: "If part of a legal transaction is void the entire legal transac-
tion is void, unless it may be assumed that it would have been entered
into even if the void part had been omitted."'' 5 7 Thus, where the
tainted undertaking is severable from the remaining ones, the court
can uphold the rest of the bargain. 58
The second difficulty emerges most clearly from a comparison of
article 138(2) with article I of the United Kingdom's Money-Lenders
Act of 1900.159 The German provision does not confer on the court
any power to reopen the transaction to determine an appropriate rate
of interest or price. Nevertheless, one commentary has argued that
article 139 may sanction such a remedy. 16° Presumably, the sugges-
tion is that a transaction, whether a sale or a loan, can be avoided
under article 138(2) only to the extent that the price or the interest
153. Judgment of Mar. 27, 1936, RG, 151 RGZ 70.
154. Judgment of June 30, 1939, RG, 161 RGZ 52.
155. 1 JULIUS VON STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR zuM BGB 828 (11th ed.). However, the
commentary refers to some authorities suggesting that no recovery is possible. Id. In one
decision, the Reichsgericht suggested that such recovery would not be allowed before the end
of the contract period. 161 RGZ 52; see also BGB-RGRK, supra note 136, at 448, note 27.
156. BGB-RGRK, supra note 136, at 441, note 10, 448, note 27.
157. BGB art. 139.
158. Judgment of Dec. 22, 1953, BGH, 9 BB 172, 174; BGB-RGRK, supra note 136, at
440, note 8.
159. Money-Lenders Act, supra note 31.
160. BGB-RGRK, supra note 136, at 441, note 10. Presumably, where the buyer is the
stronger party, the court could increase the price. However, it is difficult to see how such a
course can be sanctioned by article 139.
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rate is "disproportionate." The excess is to be severed from the mar-
ket price or from the usual interest rate. However, a judgment of the
Bundesgerichtshof 16l has questioned the availability of such a remedy.
Article 138(2) has proven, nevertheless, to be an effective weapon
in cases involving both the exploitation of one party's weakness, de-
fined as "need," "carelessness," or "inexperience," by the other and a
disparity in the value of the considerations furnished. It has, for ex-
ample, been used to resolve labor problems by imposing a heavy pen-
alty on the employee for giving notice before the end of the prescribed
period of employment. 162 Contracts in which an author grants an ex-
clusive option over all of his future works to a publisher who makes
no promises to publish them provide another illustration of uses for
article 138(2).163 In setting aside clauses and contracts of this type,
German courts have granted a remedy similar to that available in
such cases under English law.
When one of the elements required under article 138(2) is absent,
as, for example, when there is no obvious disparity in the value of the
parties' contributions, the court may grant a remedy by invoking arti-
cle 138(l).164 This provision has been used to annul unfair covenants
in restraint of trade. However, the test employed in these cases re-
flects the spirit of subsection 2. The courts grant relief where the re-
strictive clause unduly limits the covenantor's freedom of action, 165 or
where it seeks to protect the interests of only one of the parties.' 66
The court is more likely to grant relief if the restrictive covenant is
coupled with a heavy penalty for breach, 67 or if it remains in force
even where the covenantor is entitled to withdraw from the rest of the
161. Judgment of July 12, 1965, BGH, 44 BGHZ 158, 162. In Judgment of May 30, 1958,
BGH, 11 NJW 1772, a monopoly-holding seller fixed a disproportionately high price for his
goods. The court invalidated the entire contract and held that no method existed for the
determination of an appropriate price.
162. Judgment of July 30, 1904, RG, 33 JW 481; Judgment of Nov. 26, 1909, RG, 39 JW
5. See generally BGB-RGRK, supra note 136, at 453.
163. Judgment of Dec. 14, 1956, BGH, 22 BGHZ 347.
164. This provision is clear and terse: "A legal transaction which is against public policy is
void." BGB art. 138(1).
165. Judgment of Dec. 6, 1902, RG, 53 RGZ 154; Judgment of Apr. 7, 1908, RG, 68 RGZ
229; Judgment of June 10, 1964, BGH, 17 NJW 2203.
166. Judgment of Mar. 18, 1913, RG, 42 JW 592; Judgment of Nov. 14, 1915, RG, 45 JW
191.





Article 138(1) has also been invoked in cases involving contracts
known in Germany as Knebelungsvertrtag. The term refers to con-
tracts in which one party controls the economic freedom of the other
to the point that he has obtained a stranglehold over the other
party. 169 A good example of such contracts is a beer franchise
granted by a brewery to an innkeeper. In this type of contract, the
brewery frequently extends the innkeeper a loan to finance the acqui-
sition of the business. In return, the innkeeper agrees to purchase all
necessary supplies from the brewery. Occasionally, the contract binds
the innkeeper for an unusually long period of time and the brewery
supplies the beer at an unfavorable price. It is difficult for the courts
to intervene under article 138(2) because the interest rate charged by
the brewery is usually not above the market rate. Therefore, it is diffi-
cult to establish an obvious disparity in the values of the considera-
tions furnished by the parties. However, relief from such contracts
has occasionally been granted under article 138(1). 170 The test that
the courts use is basically whether or not the innkeeper loses his eco-
nomic freedom in relation to the brewery. 171 The courts consider the
extent of the restriction and whether it appears to be excessive or un-
fair.' 72 The unconscionability concept of article 138(2) is undoubt-
edly reflected in these considerations.
Another instance of "stranglehold" occurs in transactions that
involve excessive security. German law sanctions the assignment, by
way of security, of future book debts and future assets, including their
proceeds. Thus, a German bank or finance company is able to obtain
an assignment of all present and future "receivables" of a client
[Globalzession]. Similarly, a German manufacturer who supplies
goods on credit is able to acquire a security interest [Sicherungsuber-
eignung] in all goods supplied to the customer, as well as in their pro-
168. Judgment of Oct. 14, 1904, RG, 59 RGZ 76; see also BGB-RGRK, supra note 136, at
454, note 39.
169. See BGB-RGRK, supra note 136, at 449. The term is suggested by Dawson, supra
note 130, at 1071-74, who gives an excellent account of such contracts, and who uses the term
"shackling." Peter L. Murray, Priority Problems in Private Financing-The German Experi-
ence and the UCC Compared, B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 355 (1970) uses the term
"fettering."
170. See BGB-RGRK, supra note 136, at 450.
171. Judgment of Sept. 26, 1933, RG, 65 JW 569; see also BGB-RGRK, supra note 136,
note 31.
172. Judgment of Apr. 9,1970, BGH, 54 BGHZ 145; Judgment of Oct. 7, 1970, BGH, 23
NJW 2243; Judgment of Sept. 16/17, 1974, BGH, 27 NJW 2089.
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ceeds.173 However, a series of decisions by the Reichsgericht and the
Bundesgerichtshof has established that such a transaction will be set
aside if it gives the financier complete economic control over the
debtor's affairs. 174 The courts in such a case, invoking article 138(1),
use a test of fairness or conscionability.175 One commentary explains:
A security agreement, which restricts the debtor's economic free-
dom of movement to an excessive extent and which deprives him
almost entirely of his financial flexibility, is contrary to public pol-
icy. This is particularly the case when the creditor assumes a one-
sided stance, having regard solely to his security interest, and ig-
nores the valid interests of the debtor. 76
When a court sets aside this type of contract, the debtor's general
creditors or a competing secured creditor usually reaps the benefit. In
effect, article 138(1) assists, in this instance, in determining questions
of priorities.
It is important to emphasize that the foregoing discussion of arti-
cle 138 is far from complete. The discussion does, however, highlight
some of the useful roles played by this provision in German law.
Before attempting to reach conclusions about its efficacy, it is advisa-
ble to discuss the second unconscionability provision of the BGB, arti-
cle 242, and the use of the unconscionability concept with respect to
certain clauses found in standard form contracts.
Article 242 governs the performance of contractual undertakings
and provides that "[t]he debtor is bound to effect performance accord-
ing to the requirements of good faith, having regard to common us-
age."' 177 The word "debtor," as used in this article and throughout
the BGB, has been interpreted broadly. As such, it may be more ac-
curately translated as "promisor." Article 242 is thus a general provi-
sion of the German law of obligations. It provides that every contract
must be performed. in good faith and in accordance with good busi-
ness mores.
In practice, article 242 constitutes a double-edged sword. On the
173. This subject in German law has been written about extensively. For an excellent
account in English, see Murray, supra note 169.
174. See generally STAUDINGER, supra note 155, at 807-09.
175. Judgment of Dec. 21, 1933, RG, 143 RGZ 248; Judgment of Mar. 6, 1936, RG, 65
JW 1955; cf. Judgment of Nov. 9, 1955, BGH, 19 BGHZ 12.
176. BGB-RGRK, supra note 136, at 450, note 32. A court will more readily set aside the
agreement if it could mislead third parties.
177. BGB art. 242. For a useful discussion of this provision, see WOLFGANG FIKENT-




one hand, it aids the promisor if the promisee raises technical points
with regard to the promisor's contractual performance. One example
is where a buyer purports to reject delivered goods because of a min-
ute shortage in quantity, or due to defects in an insignificant propor-
tion of the goods supplied. Under article 242, such behavior violates
"good business mores."'' 78 On the other hand, the article occasionally
imposes on the promisor a duty to do more than that which is re-
quired under the express terms of the contract. For example, article
242 was invoked for such a purpose during the disastrous inflation
following World War I. During that period, the German currency
declined in value such that debt repayment based on nominalism
79
saddled creditors with enormous losses. The Reichsgericht decided
that, under article 242, debtors had a duty to repay amounts that
would compensate creditors for the loss of the currency's purchasing
power. This process became known as revalorization and was eventu-
ally sanctioned by an act passed in 1924.180 The usefulness of article
242 emerges most readily from a review of the cases decided under it.
These cases can be divided into three specific groups.
The first group is comprised of cases involving the misuse of con-
tractual rights by a promisee. Usually this occurs where the promisee
attempts to escape liability or invoke a sanction by relying on an insig-
nificant defect in the promisor's performance. Cases of this type in-
clude, for example, a creditor's attempt to invoke a forfeiture clause
for a short delay in an installment payment under a lending transac-
tion' 8' or a charter party's cancellation based on a short delay in the
ship's arrival in port. 8 2 Under article 242, such behavior is consid-
ered not acting in good faith. For the same reason, an insurer may
not cancel a policy merely because of a short delay in the payment of
a small portion of the premium.
8 3
Nevertheless, some delays are not excused under article 242.
This was discovered by an assured who failed to remit his insurance
premium by the end of a grace period and hurried to pay it immedi-
178. Judgment of Dec. 5, 1950, BGH, 1 BGHZ 4; Judgment of Dec. 11, 1956, 12 BB 92.
179. Under the nominalistic principle, a currency unit has the same value regardless of its
parity with other currencies and regardless of its purchasing power.
180. See Judgment of Nov. 28, 1923, RG, 107 RGZ 78; cf Judgment of May 16, 1951,
BGH, 2 BGHZ 150; Judgment of June 28, 1951, BGH, 2 BGHZ 379, 383; Judgment of Dec.
10, 1951, BGH, 4 BGHZ 153, 162.
181. Judgment of Oct. 30, 1936, RG, 152 RGZ 251, 258.
182. Judgment of June 29, 1927, RG, 117 RGZ 354.
183. Judgment of June 25, 1956, BGH, 21 BGHZ 123, 136.
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ately after his car sustained damage in a collision.184 A misuse of
rights likewise occurs where one party unreasonably denies some
rights to the other. For example, a tenant who is denied permission to
use the premises for a legitimate purpose may obtain a remedy under
article 242, provided that the proposed use causes no loss to the land-
lord. The remedy is available even if the proposed use is prohibited
under a duly signed standard form lease.
1 85
The second group of cases involves the inconsiderate use of
rights. An inconsiderate use occurs mainly when a promisee seeks a
specific remedy, although an alternate remedy would cause a smaller
loss to the promisor. Thus, a promisee may not simply withdraw
from a contract when his rights can be equally safeguarded by less
drastic means, such as the repair of the goods supplied. 186 Similarly, a
landowner possesses no right to claim damages from an architect if
the landowner can obtain equal satisfaction through minor repairs by
the builder. 
87
The third group consists of cases in which one party leads the
other to believe that there is no need to comply with a given contrac-
tual term and then later enforces the term. One example is where an
insurance company indicates in the course of settlement negotiations
that it will not enforce a clause limiting the time for instituting an
action. Under article 242, the company is precluded from invoking
this clause if the negotiations fail and the assured commences pro-
ceedings after the end of the prescribed period. 8 8 Similarly, a surety
may not plead a defect of form in his guarantee if the surety tells the
promisor that, being a person of honor, he will not raise such a techni-
cality. 89 Furthermore, a decision of the Bundesgerichtshof applied
the same principle when an employer induced an employee to waive a
required notarial verification of an agreement by saying, "My word is
as good as a notarial act."' 19 In English law, some of these cases
might be resolved in a similar manner through the doctrines of waiver
or promissory estoppel.
The German cases demonstrate that article 242 serves a function
184. See SOERGEL, supra note 177, at 71 n.250.
185. Id. n.251.
186. Judgment of June 5, 1905, RG, 61 RGZ 92; Judgment of Nov. 6, 1917, RG, 91 RGZ
110.
187. Judgment of May 2, 1963, BGH, 39 BGHZ 261, 265.
188. Judgment of Aug. 23, 1935, RG, 148 RGZ 300.
189. FIKENTSCHER, supra note 177, at 123.
190. Judgment of Oct. 27, 1967, BGH, 48 BGHZ 396.
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different from that of article 138. The latter provision combats un-
conscionable terms; the former condemns the unconscionable use of
contractual rights. However, the two provisions are complementary:
In certain instances, most notably those involving standard form con-
tracts, the provisions are used simultaneously.
The German courts, like their English counterparts, commenced
the assault on unfair standardized terms by resorting to the rules of
formation and construction. Inconspicuous terms could be excluded
from the contract unless they were brought to the non-drafter's atten-
tion; ambiguous terms could be construed against the drafter; and ne-
gotiated terms could be given priority over standardized terms.
Where a term reflected misuse of the drafter's monopoly power or
superior bargaining position, it was subject to challenge under article
138.191 However, from the mid-1950s, the courts policed, under arti-
cle 242, the enforceability of standardized terms by reference to their
content. Where a standardized term negated a statutory protection
that remedied defective performance or a cardinal obligation associ-
ated with the particular type of contract, the term was held to contra-
vene article 242 unless the non-drafter received a sufficient off-setting
benefit. In one of the seminal decisions, the court held that article 242
invalidated a standardized term excluding liability for product defects
unless the contract entitled the buyer to a right of repair, and, in the
event such repair failed, to withdraw from the contract.192 Another
case in point concerned the general terms and conditions of the Ger-
man banks, which excluded liability for incorrect banking references
and incorrect information regarding investments. It was held that, if
a bank supplied an incorrect reference, or gave unsound advice from
which it derived any direct or indirect advantage, it was precluded
from relying on the exemption clause. 93 The extensive case law was
consolidated into statute by the Standard Terms Act of 1976.194 The
Standard Terms Act of 1976 sets forth the general rules for incorpora-
tion and construction of standardized terms, employs the good faith
requirement of contractual balance as the general substantive con-
191. BGB-RGRK, supra note 136, at 449, note 29.
192. Judgment of Oct. 29, 1956, BGH, 22 BGHZ 90; see also Judgment of Jan. 10, 1974,
BGH, 62 BGHZ 83 (striking down a standardized term that excluded liability for product
defects and provided a right of repair, but excluded the buyer's right to withdraw from the
contract).
193. Judgment of Feb. 1, 1926, BGH, 55 JW 223, 234.
194. See Otto Sandrock, The Standard Terms Act 1976 of West Germany, 26 AM. J.
COMP. L. 551 (1978) (including a translation of the Standard Terms Act of 1976).
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straint, declares unenforceable a wide range of specific standardized
terms used in consumer and non-consumer transactions, and regu-
lates the consequences of unenforceability.
It is reasonably clear that German courts have employed articles
138 and 242 for useful purposes. Undoubtedly, German courts have
adopted a conservative approach, motivated by a desire to avoid un-
certainty in the law. Articles 138 and 242 have nevertheless intro-
duced a certain flexibility that is absent in the English and French
treatments of comparable problems. The United States' experience
supports this conclusion.
E. Unconscionability Under the United States' Uniform
Commercial Code 1 95
The Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") of the United States
includes provisions similar to those of the BGB. 196 Section 1-203
states that "every contract or duty ... imposes an obligation of good
faith in its performance or enforcement."1 97 This section, which re-
sembles article 242 of the BGB, has not instigated a great deal of
litigation. The U.C.C.'s prominent section governing unconsciona-
bility is section 2-302, which serves a function similar to that of article
138 of the BGB. Section 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may en-
force the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be af-
forded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its com-
mercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the
195. Substantial literature addresses this provision. See, e.g., Arthur A. Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967);
M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); John P. Dawson,
Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041 (1976); E. Allan
Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed
Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217 (1987); John Monaghan, Comment, Extending the Bad
Faith Tort Doctrine to General Commercial Contracts, 65 B.U. L. REV. 355 (1985).
196. See U.C.C. §§ 1-203, 2-302 (1990). The Uniform Consumer Credit Code contains
two other provisions resembling the BGB. See UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 5-108, 6-
11 (final draft 1974).




There are four major distinctions between this section and article
138 of the BGB. First, article 138 is included within the General Part
of the German Code, and it therefore has a general scope of applica-
tion. In particular, article 138 applies throughout German contract
law. In contrast, U.C.C. section 2-302 is included in the article gov-
erning sales. Thus, section 2-302 apparently commands a much nar-
rower application than does BGB article 138. While some decisions
emphasize the limited applicability of section 2-302,199 it has never-
theless been used in transactions other than sales, such as guaran-
tees,2° °  insurance contracts, 20' and leases of chattels.20 2  This
extension of the principles of section 2-302 originates from a body of
pre-U.C.C. case law dealing with various transactions not confined to
sales. This trend of applying the section in areas other than sales will
likely continue.2 3
The second distinction between BGB article 138 and U.C.C. sec-
tion 2-302 relates to the remedy. Here, the German provision is the
narrower one. The only remedy envisaged by BGB article 138 is the
setting aside of the entire contract. Reopening the transaction is not
possible under article 138. U.C.C. section 2-302, on the other hand,
provides for several measures, including reopening the transaction.
Thus, in Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 20 4 a seller who obtained an exor-
bitant price for a refrigeration unit by exploiting the buyer's ignorance
was allowed to retain the net cost of the article plus a reasonable
198. Id. § 2-302.
199. Hernandez v. S.I.C. Fin. Co., 448 P.2d 474 (N.M. 1968) (provision inapplicable to
security transactions); Bankers Trust Co. of Rochester v. Walker, 371 N.Y.S.2d 198 (App.
Div. 1975) (provision inapplicable to a guarantee); cf Division of Triple T Ser. Inc. v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 304 N.Y.S.2d 191, 200 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (provision inapplicable to termination
clause); Preston v, First Bank of Marietta, 473 N.E.2d 1210 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (provision
inapplicable to land mortgages); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983)
(provision inapplicable to loans).
200. Blount v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 432 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
201. Bishop v. Washington, 480 A.2d 1088 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Truta v. Avis Rent A
Car System, 238 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Ct. App. 1987).
202. Electronics Corp. of Am. v. Lear Jet Corp., 286 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
203. See generally U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1. Note that article 2 of the U.C.C. extends be-
yond sales, as section 2-102 applies to transactions in goods generally.
204. 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term. 1967), rev'g on other grounds 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist.
Ct. 1966) (denying the seller any allowance for profits and charges). However, if a contract is
executory when the action is brought, a court will tend to set it aside. See, e.g., American
Home Improvement Inc. v. MacIver, 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964). Courts are reluctant to re-
write contractual terms. See Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Convalescent Home, 365 N.E.2d 1285
(Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
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profit, as well as trucking and service charges. The court ordered a
refund of the balance to the buyer, enabling him to retain the unit by
paying a reasonable amount. This type of solution is clearly prefera-
ble to that available in German law, which would entail setting aside
the contract and confining the stronger party to seeking restitution
under articles 812 or 817.
Another remedy available under U.C.C. section 2-302 is the set-
ting aside of a penalty or liquidated damages clause to preclude the
stronger party from recovering more than his actual loss. 20 5 How-
ever, section 2-302 fails to provide damages for a person who enters
into an unconscionable agreement unwittingly.2°6 While such a rem-
edy is equally unavailable under BGB article 138, it occasionally
arises under BGB article 826.
The third demarcation between the two provisions arises in
U.C.C. section 2-302(2), under which the parties to a dispute involv-
ing unconscionability "shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to
present evidence as to [the contract's] commercial setting, purpose
and effect. ' '20 7 A number of decisions highlight this provision's im-
portance. 20 Although BGB article 138 contains no comparable sub-
clause, it appears that German courts possess the power to call similar
evidence. 2°9 This, however, is an outcome of the German rules of
civil procedure, under which the court takes a far more active role in
the proceedings than in the Anglo-American systems.
The fourth and most significant difference between BGB article
138 and U.C.C. section 2-302 relates to the contrast in the respective
philosophies employed by their drafters. Article 138 of the BGB sets
forth the instances in which a transaction is to be set aside for uncon-
scionability. 210 Subsection 1 empowers the court to intervene when a
transaction offends public policy. 211 Subsection 2, also called the
205. Bogatz v. Case Catering Corp., 383 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Civ. Ct. 1976); Hertz Commercial
Leasing Corp. v. Dynatron Inc., 427 A.2d 872 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980); John Deere Leasing
Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 F. Supp. 1569 (D. Kan. 1986).
206. Pearson v. National Budgeting Sys. Inc., 297 N.Y.S.2d 59 (App. Div. 1969); Barco
Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Civ. Ct. 1984).
207. U.C.C. § 2-302(2).
208. Block v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 286 A.2d 228, 233 (D.C. 1972); Mitchell-Huntley
Cotton Co. v. Lawson, 377 F. Supp. 661 (D. Ga. 1973); Darden v. Ogle, 310 So. 2d 182 (Ala.
1975); C & J Fertilizer Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975); Frank's
Maintenance & Engineering Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403 (Il1. App. Ct. 1980).
209. The German courts familiarize themselves with the specific facts and with the setting
of the assailed transaction.
210. BGB art. 138.
211. Id. art. 138(1).
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Wucher or usury clause, affects cases in which one party trades on a
weakness, defined as need, carelessness, or inexperience, of the other
party to achieve an "obviously disproportionate" gain. 21 2 When one
of these elements is missing and the transaction is not contrary to
public policy, the weaker party is left without a remedy, unless the
court is able to invoke either article 242, dealing with good faith in
performance, or article 826, concerning abuse of rights.213 The char-
acter of U.C.C. section 2-302 is far more general and enables the court
to step in whenever a transaction is found to be unconscionable. 214 It
is significant that the key word, "unconscionable," is not defined in
the U.C.C. The guidance given by Official Comment 1 to section 2-
302 is similarly general:
This section is intended to allow the court to pass judgment di-
rectly on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause
therein and to make a conclusion of law as to its unconscionability.
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable
under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the
contract .... The principle is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks
because of superior bargaining power.215
The U.C.C. comment, like section 2-302 itself, is of a general
nature. That the determination of an unconscionability issue is a mat-
ter of law emerges, in any event, from the language of subsection 1. It
is apparent from the closing words in section 2-302(2) that the court
will consider the commercial background and setting of the transac-
212. Id. art. 138(2).
213. Id. arts. 242, 826.
214. Some authorities attempt to define unconscionability, but do not add much to the
factors emphasized in Official Comment 1 to section 2-302. See Williams v. Walker Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (stressing the lack of choice); Central
Budget Corp. v. Sanchez, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (Civ. Ct. 1967); Blount v. Westinghouse
Credit Corp., 432 S.W.2d 549, 559 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (suggesting as a test that the bargain
ought to be one "no man in his senses ... would enter into and which no honest and fair
person would accept"); Gimbel Bros. v. Swift, 307 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Civ. Ct. 1970) (transaction
must "affront the sense of decency"); Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 651-52 (N.J. 1971),
modifying 266 A.2d 144 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1970) (suggests links with fraud); J.A. Jones Constr.
Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977), appeal dismissed, 377 A.2d 1 (Del.
1977) (emphasizing "reasonable" test); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114
(Ct. App. 1982) (unfairness in bargain); Dorso Trailer Sales, Inc. v. American Body & Trailer
Inc., 372 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (absence of reasonable choice); Construction
Assoc. Inc. v. Fargo Water Equip. Co., 446 N.W.2d 237 (N.D. 1989) (one-sidedness of terms).
215. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
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tion. The only additional guidance given by the comment is, first,
that the court is to consider the extent to which the bargain is one-
sided; second, that mere inequality of bargaining power is not suffi-
cient to overturn the bargain; and, third, that the presence of surprise
or oppression is of paramount importance.
None of the guidelines set out in the comment, or in section 2-
302 itself, is as definitive as BGB article 138. One author suggests
that the distinction, in essence, is that section 2-302 is a general
clause, and the German provision, in particular subsection 2, is not.
21 6
Another way of explaining the difference is to focus on the extent of
discretion conferred by the two provisions. A German court has to
satisfy itself that a transaction that it is asked to set aside falls either
within subsection 1 by being contrary to public policy, or that it is
usurious within the meaning of subsection 2. The German court's
function, therefore, is principally to apply the article's rule. A United
States court has much more discretion, having the power to define
what constitutes "unconscionable." This is a far more creative role
than that assigned to the German courts.
The difference between the roles of the German and United
States courts in determining unconscionability issues is considerably
less pronounced in practice than in theory. This is due in large part to
the fact that BGB article 138 does not operate in isolation. It is aug-
mented by articles 242 and 826, which confer substantial discretion
on the German courts, as does the public policy principle enshrined in
article 138(1). Moreover, despite the wide discretion conferred by
U.C.C. section 2-302 on the United States courts, an undercurrent of
caution runs through the decisions. This is demonstrated by a review
of the authorities that have defined the major elements of unconscio-
nability: the parties' inequality of bargaining power, disparity in the
considerations furnished, trading on a party's weakness by the other,
and public policy. A specific topic of interest is the application of
section 2-302 to exemption clauses in standard form contracts.
Official Comment 1 suggests that mere inequality in the parties'
bargaining power is an inadequate reason to brand a transaction un-
conscionable. Substantial case law supports this statement. 21 7 Thus,
some authorities indicate that where the weaker party is aware of the
216. Dawson, supra note 130, at 1042, 1052. This remains the case even with respect to
the amended version of article 138(2).




nature of the bargain and is familiar with the trade in question, inter-
vention under section 2-302 is unjustified despite the weaker party's
inferior bargaining position. 21 8 Similarly, there is no chance of a find-
ing of unconscionability if the parties conducted genuine negotia-
tions.219 A fortiori, unconscionability is not possible where the parties
have equal bargaining capacity and commercial expertise.
220
The situation differs when the stronger party exploits his superior
position in order to extract an exceedingly one-sided bargain. A
United States court has the jurisdiction to set aside or to reopen a
contract in which the considerations furnished are disproportionate.
Thus, in American Home Improvement Inc. v. Maclver,221 a contract
in which a consumer agreed to pay a total of $2568.60, which in-
cluded a "sales commission" of $800 and a finance charge of $809.60,
for goods and services worth $959, was held to be unconscionable.
Later cases confirm that a contract may be held unconscionable on
the basis of price alone.222 In this respect, the United States courts
have shown less restraint than the German courts, which require ex-
ploitation of a party's "weakness" in addition to a disparity in consid-
eration. However, one United States court cautioned against reducing
section 2-302 to a "mathematical ... formula," and emphasized that
courts should intervene only where the price is grossly excessive.
223
United States courts have invoked section 2-302 where the price was
at least two and one-half times above the market value. They are,
likewise, prepared to attack highly excessive interest rates.
224
218. State Bank of Albany v. Hickey, 288 N.Y.S.2d 980 (Sup. Ct. 1968), aff'd, 298
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1969); Dow Coming Corp. v. Capital Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.
1969); K & C Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 263 A.2d 390 (Pa. 1970); cf. Blount v. West-
inghouse Credit Corp., 432 S.W.2d 549 (rex. Civ. App. 1968). But see Pittsfield Weaving Co.
v. Grove Textiles Inc., 430 A.2d 638 (N.H. 1981).
219. Raybond Elecs., Inc. v. Glen-Mar Door Mfg. Co., 528 P.2d 160, 166 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1974).
220. Id.; Royal Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Hancock Bank and Trust Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 309 N.E.2d 482 (Mass. 1974).
221. 201 A.2d 886 (N.H. 1964); see also Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757
(Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (App. Term. 1967).
222. Toker v. Perl, 247 A.2d 701 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968), aff'd on other grounds,
260 A.2d 244 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970); Toker v Westerman, 274 A.2d 78 (N.J. Dist.
Ct. 1970); Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 652 (N.J. 1970); Patterson v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. 1971).
223. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
224. This emerges from Mobile Am. Corp. v. Howard, 307 So. 2d 507 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Singer Co. v. Gardner, 296 A.2d 562 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1972). However, where the uncon-
scionable transaction is a consumer credit contract, a remedy is available under the U.C.C.
See Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503 (Cal. 1985).
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Like their German counterparts, and in harmony with Official
Comment 1, United States courts consider any exploitation of one
party's weakness by the other. In Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
ture Co. ,225 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
proposed that one component of unconscionability was "an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties. ' 226 Obviously,
some similarity exists between "absence of choice" and the element of
"need" or of a "state of necessity" mentioned in BGB article 138(2).
Trading on a party's ignorance was held to be unconscionable in
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 227 where a buyer with limited command
of the English language was induced to sign an onerous contract that
had never been translated to him.
Cases involving "referral franchises" or "pyramid selling
schemes" provide examples of the exploitation of a party's careless-
ness. Thus, in Lefkowitz v. ITM Inc. ,228 goods were sold at prices up
to six times their actual cost. The purchaser was induced to enter this
bargain by a promise that the purchaser would be paid a commission
of fifty dollars or more for every new customer he introduced, and by
an assurance that the profits he made would cover the price of his
own purchases. The court held this transaction unconscionable under
U.C.C. section 2-302.229
Another similarity between German and United States uncon-
scionability analyses is that the courts have the power to grant a rem-
edy where the bargain is contrary to public policy.230 In both
countries, the courts have stressed that the unconscionability concept
will not support a general assault on exemption clauses in standard
form contracts. 23' An exemption clause may, nevertheless, be struck
225. 350 F.2d 445 (D.D.C. 1965); cf Kugler, 279 A.2d at 640.
226. Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
227. 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1967); see also Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct.
1969). But see Hydraforin Prod. Corp. v. American Steel and Aluminium Corp., 498 A.2d 339
(N.H. 1985) (showing that inequality in bargaining power is not, in itself, an adequate basis for
a finding of unconscionability).
228. 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 321-22 (Sup. Ct. 1966); see also Frostifresh, 281 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
229. Le/kowitz, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 322. For another type of "pressure," see Abbott v. Ab-
bott, 195 N.W.2d 204 (Neb. 1972).
230. One example is where a contract contains an unduly wide exemption clause. See
Unico v. Owen, 232 A.2d 405, 418 (N.J. 1967).
231. See generally Haynie v. A & H Camper Sales, Inc., 208 S.E.2d 354 (Ga. Ct. App.
1974); Kleven v. Geigy Agric. Chems., 227 N.W.2d 566 (Minn. 1975); KKO, Inc. v. Honey-




down if justified by the commercial background and setting of the
contract and by the extravagant nature of the exemption clause.232
It is important to reiterate that no attempt has been made to de-
fine "unconscionability." Indeed, the very nature of section 2-302
renders such an attempt a difficult task. The policy of the U.C.C. was
stated succinctly by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Kugler v.
Romain:
The standard of conduct contemplated by the unconscionability
clause is good faith, honesty in fact and observance of fair dealing.
The need for application of the standard is most acute when the
professional seller is seeking the trade of those most subject to ex-
ploitation: the uneducated, the inexperienced and the people of
low incomes. In such a context, a material departure from the
standard puts a badge of fraud on the transaction and here the
concepts of fraud and of unconscionability are interchangeable.
233
This quotation spells out the main criteria used by a United
States court to adjudicate an unconscionability issue. In practice,
these issues are determined in a similar manner both in Germany and
in the United States. It will, nevertheless, be useful to consider which
of the two approaches, that of the U.C.C. or that of the BGB, should
be preferred. This question is answered in the next part of this Arti-
cle, which also discusses whether the adoption of an unconscionability
concept is a better solution than the practices prevailing in England
and in France.
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The foregoing comparison of the laws of England and France
with those of Germany and the United States demonstrates the merits
of a general unconscionability concept. This Article suggests that the
courts will endeavour to grant relief against an unfair or harsh bar-
gain, regardless of whether or not such a concept is applicable in a
given system. Where the courts cannot do so openly, by relying on
provisions such as U.C.C. section 2-302 or BGB articles 138 and 242,
they strive to attain their objective indirectly. The judicial extension
232. Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds Inc., 326 A.2d 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974)
(section 2-302 applied to a contract between businessmen); see also Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v.
Smith, 240 A.2d 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968); Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 188 S.E.2d 250 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 208 S.E.2d
321 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974).
233. 279 A.2d at 652 (emphasis added) (note the similarity between "material departure"
and "disparity of price").
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of the abusive clauses legislation in France and the remarkable devel-
opment of promissory estoppel in English law are telling illustrations
on point.
This trend furnishes a strong argument in support of the adop-
tion of general unconscionability rules. It is objectionable to force the
courts to do justice by stealth. A judge who states that "this transac-
tion is hereby set aside because it is unconscionable" speaks his mind.
A judge who, to set aside the same transaction, must find some excuse
for placing it within one of the tight compartments available under
the applicable system resorts to legal fiction.
If this conclusion is correct, it substantiates another argument in
support of a general unconscionability doctrine. Fiction may occa-
sionally be a useful substitute for statutory reform, but it has the
harmful side effect of introducing artifice into the law. By way of
illustration, take the French distinction between a "derisory price,"
which entitles the court to set aside the contract of sale, and a "lesion-
ary price," which is per se uncontestable. The arbitrariness of this
distinction and the difficulties posed by it are highlighted by the Judg-
ment of January 25, 1965.234 It may be countered that German law
has a similarly dubious distinction. Under BGB article 138(2), the
difference between an "obvious disproportion" in the considerations
furnished and a lesser disparity seems artificial. This comparison,
however, is unsound. The German provision lays down a perfectly
clear test, which must be applied by a court when it determines an
issue under article 138(2). The French principle, in contrast, in-
troduces a vague element by employing the emotionally charged term
"derisory." This unclear word was used to support the fictitious con-
tention that a derisory, or very low, price is no price at all and that, on
this basis, the contract of sale is without cause. However, what con-
stitutes a low price is an inadequate test.
A particular merit of a general unconscionability concept is that
it creates room for flexibility. A court can apply it in a specific case
without modifying the entire law governing the transaction in ques-
tion. For this reason, there is no need to exclude unconscionability
rules from any specific area of contract law. The effect of a general
doctrine is to confer a supervisory power or jurisdiction on the courts,
which will not upset the stability of any individual area.
It may be suggested that even in legal systems that have not




adopted the unconscionability concept, the courts continue to exercise
a supervisory jurisdiction by means of specific rules, such as the rule
against penalties. It is, however, undeniable that these specific rules
are of much narrower application than a general doctrine. It is
equally undeniable that there are cases in which a remedy, available
under general unconscionability rules, is unavailable in a system that
has not adopted them. The Judgment of January 25, 1965, a case
concerning Catalan frescos, is, again, a good example. In French law,
which regarded the price as "lesionary" but not as "derisory," the
sellers lost.235 English law, in all probability, would have led to a
similar outcome.236 German and United States courts would have
been in a much better position to grant a remedy, as all of the ele-
ments of unconscionability existed in the frescos case. The sellers
were illiterate and simple-minded, and the buyers exploited this weak-
ness by purchasing at an obviously low or "disproportionate" price.
Thus, German and United States law would have enabled a court to
grant the very remedy that the French tribunal, despite its sympathy
for the sellers, was unable to provide. Another illustration is pyramid
sales schemes. United States courts were able to combat these un-
wholesome devices with section 2-302. It is significant that in some
other common law jurisdictions where the unconscionability concept
was inapplicable, the legislature had to pass special acts to outlaw
these devices.237 Presumably, no common law remedy was available
in these jurisdictions to gullible victims of pyramid sales.
The foregoing comparative study of the legal systems of England,
France, Germany, and the United States confirms that the unconscio-
nability concept serves a useful function. Moreover, the experience
gained in Germany and in the United States demonstrates that a gen-
eral unconscionability doctrine does not introduce uncertainty into
the law of contract. The fact is that both the United States and the
German courts have been cautious and conservative in exercising
their powers under the unconscionability rules applicable in their re-
spective systems. Indeed, in both countries the courts tend to com-
pare the terms of transactions assailed under the unconscionability
rules with the terms available for such deals from other sources. The
courts have been strongly disinclined to intervene in a transaction
founded on ordinary terms. Therefore, the danger of unconscionabil-
235. Judgment of Jan. 25, 1965, Cass. civ. Ire, 1965 Recueil Dalloz [D.S. Jur.] 217 (Fr.).
236. The undue influence doctrine might have provided an escape route.
237. See, e.g., Commerce Act, 1975, § 31 (N.Z.).
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ity rules being used as a general assault on standard form contracts
can be ruled out.23
8
It is submitted that unconscionability rules contain sufficient
merit and importance to warrant their introduction into any modem
legal system.239 While they do not provide a general answer to the
problems of one-sided contracts, and while they cannot possibly re-
place statutes that regulate an entire branch of law, such as consumer
protection measures, unconscionability rules confer a desirable sup-
plementary power on the courts. In other words, unconscionability is
a residual though essential concept. Having reached this conclusion,
it remains to be seen which type of provision, that of the U.C.C. or
those of the BGB, is to be preferred.
The main difference between the United States' approach to un-
conscionability, as seen in U.C.C. section 2-302, and the German one,
as highlighted by BGB article 138(2), is that the former does not at-
tempt to define the concept, and the latter provides a clear test. It is
submitted that the United States' solution, which confers wide discre-
tion on the courts, is preferable. The German provision can, on occa-
sion, force the courts to resort to the very type of artificial approach
employed by their English and French counterparts. This can occur
in a transaction involving a striking disparity in the considerations
furnished, or a "usurious price," but which does not contain an ele-
ment of exploitation of one party by the other. If the court wishes to
grant relief on the ground of unconscionability, it has to invent such a
weakness, or artificially invoke the public policy provision of article
138(1). The court may face a similar dilemma of refusing a remedy or
resorting to fiction if there has been an exploitation of one party's
weakness, but the value of the considerations is substantially, rather
than strikingly, disproportionate. If the courts are given power to
grant relief against unconscionable bargains, it is best to leave the ulti-
mate decision as to what constitutes unconscionability in their hands.
The United States' experience proves that this approach to un-
conscionability does not introduce uncertainty into contract law.
Moreover, section 2-302 has not led to inconsistency among decisions
reached by different courts. Two factors contribute to this harmoni-
238. It is significant that the German legislature found it necessary to pass a special Law
on the Regulation of Standardized Contract Terms: Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Al-
gemeinen Geschaftsbedingungen of December 9, 1976 (AGBGe). See THE CIVIL LAW SYS-
TEM, supra note 133, at 1207.
239. The long-term impact of the EEC must not be overlooked or underestimated. There
will be an equal impact on legal development in three of the jurisdictions studied here.
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ous outcome. The first is the existence of the law reports. On occa-
sion, courts do express disapproval of existing cases and take an
independent stand. However, they are inclined to follow existing pre-
cedent, even if these cases are not binding. Second, the Official Com-
ment provides guidelines describing the factors that a court ought to
take into account in determining unconscionability issues. These
guidelines are neither exhaustive nor binding, but they do assist the
courts in reaching a conclusion. In this way, the Official Comment
has contributed to the attainment of a fair degree of uniformity in the
case law concerning section 2-302. The provision of guidelines of this
sort is desirable and constitutes a better approach than setting exact
boundaries for "unconscionability," as found in BGB article 138(2).
Another advantage of the United States' provision, as compared
with Germany's, is in the variety of remedies available under section
2-302, as opposed to the inflexibility of article 138, which provides
solely for the setting aside of the contract or offending clause. It is in
the interests of both parties to an unconscionable contract that the
courts be authorized to grant the most suitable remedy. Thus, where
a loan is usurious, it is best if the court has the power to determine a
suitable rate; setting aside the entire contract is contrary to the inter-
ests of both parties. Moreover, it is conceptually sound to suggest
that if the courts are given the power to intervene in transactions that
they consider unconscionable, they should likewise be given wide dis-
cretion regarding the remedy to be granted in any given case.
The courts should, therefore, have the power to set aside the un-
conscionable bargain in its entirety, to delete from the contract any
unconscionable clauses, and the power to reopen and to reshape the
bargain. They should also have the power to order restitution of
money paid and the return of property delivered under the uncon-
scionable bargain. All of these remedies are available under U.C.C.
section 2-302. In addition, there is much to be said for granting the
courts the additional power to make an order for the payment of
damages.
While the United States' approach appears to provide better gui-
dance for reform than Germany's approach, there is one aspect in
which the provisions of the BGB are superior to those of the U.C.C.
Section 2-302 is explicitly confined in its application to cases involving
unconscionable bargains. The unconscionability of the contract, or of
some of its terms, must therefore be present at inception. Although
this applies with equal force to BGB article 138, the German courts
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have been able to augment this provision by skillful manipulation of
article 242. It will be recalled that, under this article, the courts are
able to combat the unfair use of contractual rights, even where the
clause conferring these rights is not unconscionable per se. Section 1-
203 of the U.C.C., which resembles BGB article 242 in its language,
has not been put to a similarly extensive use by the United States
courts. A provision such as article 242 is complementary to a provi-
sion such as BGB article 138 or U.C.C. section 2-302, which combats
unconscionable terms. It is submitted that the inclusion of such a
supplementary provision in a modem enactment of an unconsciona-
bility concept is of paramount importance. Moreover, it ought to be
set out in language clearer than that of BGB article 242. Finally, it is
believed that courts, which are able to combat unconscionable bar-
gains and dealings by resorting to the two types of provision, are in
the best position to supervise the commercial integrity of contracting
parties.
